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     It is widely accepted that the rigidities created by labor market institutions explain the 
pattern of unemployment across countries. A rapidly expanding recent literature has explored 
the statistical support for this orthodox view. This paper offers a critical perspective on the 
evidence. We focus on the protective institutions that are the usual suspects: unemployment 
benefit entitlements, employment protection laws, and trade unions. Given the dominance of 
this view, the simple correlation evidence offers remarkably little support. The most robust 
finding of the cross-country regression literature points to a potentially important role for 
unemployment benefits generosity, but there are reasons to doubt the strength of this 
relationship and even the direction of causation. The micro evidence on the effects of major 
changes in benefit generosity on the duration of unemployment (and the exit rate into 
employment) is much less supportive of a sizable impact of benefit generosity on the 
aggregate unemployment rate than is often suggested. Finally, we find little evidence to 
suggest that changes in the strength of these protective labor market institutions can explain 
either the success of the “success stories” or the continued high unemployment of the four 
large continental European countries.  
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  As recently as 1979, only Ireland and Portugal among the 20 most developed (OECD-
member) countries reported unemployment rates above 8 percent (each at about 8.5%). Just 
four years later, 11 of these 20 countries posted higher rates and six reached double-digit 
levels, ranging from Belgium (10.7%) to Ireland (14.9%).  This collapse in employment 
performance persisted throughout the 1980s and 1990s. Between 1995 and 1997, as the U.S. 
was showing rates between 5.6 to 4.9 percent, OECD-Europe ranged from 10.1 to 9.7 
percent. By 2005, the OECD-Europe rate had dropped to 8.6 percent, but both core 
economies of continental Europe, France and Germany, had rates of 9.5 percent.
2    
Much like the response of economists to the Great Depression, the dominant 
explanation for persistent high unemployment has centered on supply-side rigidities 
generated by protective labor market institutions, and correspondingly, the proposed solution 
has been greater (downward) wage flexibility and stronger work incentives. As Fitoussi 
(2006) has put it, “The reference model, in the plea for structural reforms, is centered on an 
economy with perfect competition and rational expectations. In such a model full 
employment is always assured absent rigidities...”.  Spurred in particular by the influence of 
the Layard, Nickell and Jackman (1991) and the OECD’s Jobs Study (1994), this orthodox 
rigidity account thoroughly ruled the field by the late 1990s with quite straightforward policy 
implications. The IMF (2003, p. 129) points out that “leading international institutions – the 
IMF, OECD and the European Commission – have long argued that the causes of 
unemployment can be found in labor market institutions. Accordingly, countries with high 
unemployment have been repeatedly urged to undertake comprehensive structural reforms to 
reduce ‘labor market rigidities.’” This view has become so widely accepted that a leading 
scholar could recently claim in the Journal of Economic Perspectives that “evidence supports 
the traditional view that rigidities that reduce competition in labor markets are typically 
responsible for high unemployment” without actually citing any peer-reviewed evidence (St. 
Paul, 2004, p. 53).  
Three labor market institutions have been held to play the premier roles in the 
promotion of employment-unfriendly rigidities: unemployment benefit entitlements, 
employment protection laws, and trade unions.
3 Not coincidentally, these are the key 
institutional mechanisms most developed countries have relied upon to shelter less-skilled 
workers from the most harmful effects of competitive labor markets. We will refer to them as   4
“protective labor market institutions” (PLMIs) and distinguish them from other key 
institutions that have important labor market effects. These include active labor market 
policies (ALMP), which are concerned with matching and preparing workers for jobs; tax 
policy, which influences behavior and affects labor costs, but is principally designed to raise 
revenue, not protect workers; and housing policies, which affect ownership rates and could 
affect worker mobility, but are not designed to protect workers as workers.       
The dominance of the orthodox rigidities explanation of unemployment and the recent 
focus on macroeconometric testing reflects a striking evolution in mainstream economics. As 
recently as 1994, Charles Bean’s influential survey of European unemployment allocated 
little space to evidence on the effects of these key PLMIs on employment performance, 
finding little compelling empirical support in the literature for any of them.
4 Bean concluded 
with three recommendations for future research, the first of which was to discourage 
macroeconometric testing: “There is simply not enough information in the data to give clear 
signals on the relative merits of the competing hypotheses” (p. 615). Ignoring this advice, 
cross-country macroeconometric studies have expanded at an increasing rate (e.g., see 
OECD, 2006; Blanchard, 2006).   
   This paper critically assesses the empirical evidence on the effects of labor market 
institutions on the cross country pattern of unemployment, focusing on the role played by the 
three core protective institutions – unemployment benefits, employment protection, and trade 
unions.  After outlining the basic facts on the cross-country pattern of unemployment and 
labor market institutions, section 2 considers some issues of measurement. Section 3 then 
evaluates the simple correlation evidence between standard measures of labor market 
institutions and unemployment. Section 4 addresses the macroeconometric evidence. Since 
the most robust evidence in favor of the orthodox rigidity view concerns the role played by 
unemployment benefit generosity, Section 5 takes a closer look at the interpretation of 
benefit effects in the macroeconometric research. It also reviews the microeconometric 
evidence, which has often been cited as supporting evidence. Section 6 then assesses recent 
efforts to develop aggregate indicators of labor market reform with the goal of showing the 
payoff of comprehensive labor market reform for employment performance. We conclude in 
Section 7 with a summary and a brief discussion of the interplay between theory, evidence 
and policy recommendations.     5
 
1. Unemployment and Institutions: The Basic Facts 
  Figure 1 shows the levels and dispersion of unemployment rates for 19 OECD-member 
countries for each 5-year period between 1960 and 2004, and includes the most recent figures 
for 2005 at the far right. As a reference, the line that runs from left to right marks the U.S. 
rate. The table at the bottom presents the U.S. rate, the median, and a measure of the 
dispersion of rates (the standard deviation). 
  This figure highlights some key facts about the changing nature of the unemployment 
problem in the developed world. First, nearly all countries experienced escalating 
unemployment through at least the late 1980s. The median unemployment rate (see the table 
below the Figure) rose from 1.9% in the late 1960s to 8.8% in 1990-94. Second, the 
dispersion of rates has moved upward with the median. The standard deviation for these 19 
countries increased sharply from the 1.2 – 2.2 range in the 1960s-70s to 3.3 – 4.5 in the 
1980s-90s. Third, unemployment rates have declined and converged substantially since the 
late 1990s: the median fell from 7.9% in 1995-99 to 5.3% in 2000-04 and 5.2% for 2005; the 
standard deviation fell from 3.9 to just below 2, which is about where it was on average in 
the 1970s. The figure shows that the distribution of unemployment rates in 2005 falls in a 
range of about six percentage points (from four to ten percent), about the same as the range in 
1960-74 (from about zero to 6 percent). And fourth, the unemployment performance of the 
U.S. varies dramatically over this period, from among the countries with the very highest 
rates through the first two decades (1960-79) to among those with the lowest rates in the 
second half of the 1990s, and back again to close to the median since 2000 (2000-04 and 
2005). It is also worth noting that New Zealand has regained its position as the country with 
the lowest unemployment rate; Ireland has dropped to the second lowest rate from the second 
highest in 1985-94; and Spain as experienced a remarkable decline, to a level that is now just 
below that of Germany and France.  
  In the popular press and in a surprising number of professional papers, “Europe” is often 
portrayed as a single entity characterized by high unemployment and strong social 
protections, in contrast to the much better performing and relatively unregulated labor 
markets of the U.S. and other Anglo-Saxon economies. This conventional view greatly 
misrepresents the facts. Table 1 provides unemployment rates for 2003 by demographic   6
group for countries in three groupings: six English-speaking countries with generally low 
unemployment (Canada remains at higher levels); six high unemployment continental 
European countries; and six European low unemployment countries.  
  This table shows that the six liberal, English speaking countries had average 
unemployment rates nearly identical to those of the six low-unemployment European 
countries for all four demographic groups – male and female young and prime age workers. 
The five high-unemployment Continental countries show substantially higher unemployment 
for each age-gender group. With the exception of Germany, each has experienced extremely 
high youth unemployment. Female youth show rates of 17.5% in Belgium, 22.8% in France, 
27.2% in Spain, and 30.9% in Italy; male youth rates range from 18-23%. Clearly, young 
people in these four countries account for an important part of the European unemployment 
problem. It should be recognized, however, that using an alternative measure of 
unemployment – as a share of the youth population rather than as a share of the youth labor 
force – the picture looks quite a bit different. With this alternative measure, for example, 
France and the U.S. have similar youth unemployment rates (Howell, 2005, chapter 1).  
  The similarity between unemployment rates for the liberal English-speaking countries 
and low-unemployment Europe is notable because the latter remain characterized by strong 
welfare states and highly protective labor market institutions. Table 2 shows that while both 
of the European groups are characterized by much higher levels of social protection and 
regulation (rows 4-9) and much higher tax revenue shares (row 10), only the 
conservative/corporatist economies of ‘high-unemployment Europe” show worse 
employment performance than the liberal economies. Indeed, on both unemployment and 
employment rates, the northern European welfare states show, on average, superior labor 
market performance to the liberal ones (rows 1-3), and they do so with much lower wage 
inequality (row 11). As Nickell (1997; 2003) has pointed out, many Europeans live in regions 
with lower unemployment rates than the U.S. and most of the unemployed of Europe live in 
four large countries (France, Spain, Italy and Germany). 
 
 
2. Measurement Issues    7
Before examining considering the statistical evidence on the relationships between 
unemployment and labor market institutions, it is worth taking a brief look at the 
construction and quality of the measures. While the literature has been characterized by a 
steady increase in the sophistication of econometric techniques, remarkably little attention 
has been paid to the quality and consistency of the data. This is particularly curious, since, 
thanks largely to the efforts of the OECD, there have been impressive improvements in both 
the quality of the institutional measures and the consistency of the unemployment series.   
 
  2.1 Unemployment 
For the most part, empirical work on unemployment has proceeded under the assumption 
that the dependent variable – the unemployment rate – is well-measured and comparable 
(“harmonized” or “standardized”) over time and across countries. Indeed, rarely do authors 
offer more than simply a citation for the source of the variable. But a closer look at the data 
shows that comparability is often limited and that the many different series in use can 
produce quite different results. 
The source data are collected at the national level, both as “registered” unemployment 
(collected by the national employment service) and from household surveys (similar to the 
U.S. Current Population Survey). Over time, OECD countries have adopted international 
standards that establish the criteria for who is “unemployed” based on household surveys, but 
some series refer to those between 15-64 (for the U.S. it is age 16) and others to those over 
age 15. While comparability has increased as data collection and processing methods and 
criteria have converged across countries, both the OECD and the U.S. Bureau of Labor 
Statistics have developed additional series that attempt to make the rates more comparable 
(Sorrentino, 2000).  
But full comparability remains elusive. Since the unemployed cannot be employed, 
how a respondent replies to the question asking whether or not he/she was employed for at 
least an hour for pay in the reference week will reflect to some degree local social norms and 
levels of economic development (Howell, 2005). What is considered “real” employment may 
differ substantially across regions and countries, and this may help explain, for example, how 
Mexico and the U.S. could have similar unemployment rates, calculated with similar 
definitions and methods (Howell, 2005; Martin, 2000).      8
  In the early unemployment-institutions tests by Layard, Nickell and Jackman (1991) a 
simple cross section of unemployment rates averaged over the 1984-89 period was used. As 
the literature has progressed, analysts have demanded annual series covering a much longer 
period, often stretching back to the early 1960s, and aimed at explaining changes in 
unemployment over time with changes in institutional and policy measures, with fixed 
country effects (see section 4). This empirical strategy relies heavily on the use of historically 
consistent unemployment rate series for each country.
5 For many countries, this consistency 
criterion is clearly not satisfied. National methods have changed substantially over this 
period and there is no standardized or even historically consistent series that comes close to 
dating back even to the 1970s for many of the 19 or so OECD countries that usually appear 
in the cross-country tests. For example, the OECD’s standardized data extend back to 1980 
for just 9 OECD countries. The OECD’s longest historical unemployment series (not 
standardized) is available for just 9 countries for 1970 and 4 countries for 1965.
6  
Our attempt to determine the change in the OECD’s unemployment rate for The 
Netherlands over the last two decades offers an illustration of the problem with the historical 
statistics. The Bassanini-Duval (2006) macroeconometric tests provide the empirical basis 
for Chapter 7 of the new OECD Employment Outlook (2006). This research focuses on the 
1982-2003 period, and in both the Bassanini-Duval report and the Employment Outlook 
Chapter, a cross-country scatter plot of predicted against “observed” changes in 
unemployment is presented for 1982-2003 (OECD 2006, Figure 7.3). The conclusion drawn 
from this correlation is that a small number of labor market policies and institutions can 
largely account for cross-country differences in how unemployment has evolved since the 
early 1980s.   
The Bassanini-Duval figure shows a decline in unemployment over the 1982-2003 period 
for Holland of over 9 percentage points, based on a 1982 rate of 13.2 percent. The referenced 
source is the OECD’s Labour Force Statistics, but in the OECD’s Labour Force Statistics 
publication (OECD, 2004) the change is just 7.4 percentage points (11.6% in 1982 to 4.2% in 
2003). Another OECD series – the standardized rates that appear in the OECD’s 
Employment Outlook - shows a still smaller change of 4 points (7.68 to 3.68). By way of 
comparison, the series used by the IMF (2003) and Nickell et al. (2001) shows a 4.8 point 
change (8.5 to 3.7).
7  The poorly performing countries are located at the other end of the   9
Bassanini-Duval figure. The worst among these is Switzerland, which shows an increase in 
observed unemployment for 1982-2003 of about 4 percentage points. The problem is that it is 
computed on the basis of an implausibly low 1982 unemployment rate of 0.2 percent. Prior to 
1991, the Swiss data referred only to registered unemployment, and for this reason the OECD 
publishes no standardized figures for Switzerland prior to that date. In short, the 4 point 
increase in Swiss unemployment reflects a comparison of a registered rate of 0.2 percent in 
1982 and a household survey based rate of 4.2 percent in 2003. The change between them 
has little meaning, either for changes in employment performance within the country or for 
cross-country comparisons. Switzerland is by no means unique in relying on administrative 
data for historical time series.
8 
The Dutch and Swiss are extreme examples that illustrate the weaknesses in the historical 
time series on unemployment for many countries. The comparability of the unemployment 
rate numbers declines substantially the further back the time series runs – it is not until the 
early 1990s that nearly all major OECD member countries generally adopted the ILO 
standard (the broad definition of unemployment based on household surveys). But even for 
recent years, differences remain both across countries and over time within countries over 
exactly how the ILO unemployment rate is calculated (such as what qualifies as “active” job 
search), which may have important effects on the calculated rate. At a minimum, since the 
quality and consistency of the data have evolved and the use of different series can produce 
different results, it seems appropriate for studies to provide more documentation and 
justification for their data.    
 
2.2 Labor Market Institutions 
  Statistical tests of the effects of labor market institutions on the pattern of unemployment 
required the development of measures of institutions and policies. This effort was pioneered 
by Nickell and Layard, whose measures appeared in a series of papers and books in the early- 
and mid-1990s (Layard, Nickell, and Jackman, 1991 and 1994; Nickell and Bell, 1994; 
Layard and Nickell, 1996). Considerable subjective judgment was required for many of these 
inherently difficult-to-measure institutions. 
  For example, the measure of unemployment benefits duration that was employed 
extensively in the 1990s was an estimate of the number of years a representative unemployed   10
worker was eligible for benefits. Thus, Layard et al. (1994, p. 74) gave the U.S. a score of .5, 
Denmark 2.5, and France 3.75. With eight other countries, The Netherlands received a 4, 
indicating “indefinite” duration of benefits. In their survey of the benefit entitlement 
literature, Atkinson and Micklewright (1991) single out these data for criticism, pointing out 
that the institutional design of each of the countries with “indefinite” duration scores are 
quite different, and these differences have substantial effects on how generous the systems 
really are for which parts of the unemployed population.
9  To take one example, Atkinson 
and Micklewright (Table 3, p. 1696) explain that the reality behind the “indefinite” score for 
the Netherlands in the mid-1980s is considerably more complicated and certainly not 
indefinite: “UI at 70% of last earned wage for between 6 months and 5 years depending on 
contribution record, plus one year of benefit at 70% of minimum wage… On expiry of UI, 
(there is a) possibility of means-tested assistance.”   
  The creation of measures of institutions and policies like benefit duration, employment 
protection, and bargaining coordination requires considerable subjective judgment, and this 
has raised additional concerns. If the empirical tests are designed to confirm strongly held 
theoretical priors (institution-caused rigidities explain unemployment) and the same 
researchers generate the measures of the key explanatory variables (the institutions), it would 
be likely that measures that do the best job of confirming the guiding hypotheses will be 
preferred. Blanchard and Wolfers warn of this “Darwinian” effect:  
One must worry however that these results are in part the result of research Darwinism. 
The measures used by Nickell have all been constructed ex-post facto, by researchers 
who were not unaware of unemployment developments. When constructing a measure 
of employment protection for Spain, it is hard to forget that unemployment in Spain is 
very high… Also, given the complexity in measuring institutions, measures which do 
well in explaining unemployment have survived better than those that did not 
(Blanchard and Wolfers, 2000, p. c22). 
 
 The  1994  Jobs Study triggered a major OECD effort to produce better quality 
institutional measures. The objective was, like the first generation efforts, to facilitate tests of 
the orthodox cornerstone of the Jobs Study, that strong labor market institutions explains 
employment performance across countries. But the creation of these improved measures took 
time, and meanwhile researchers demanded longer time series.    11
  In the case of a measure of the strictness of employment protection laws, Blanchard and 
Wolfers took the recently developed OECD country estimates (OECD, 1999) and merged 
them with an entirely different series produced by Lazear (1990) to create an EPL score for 
each 5-year period from the early 1960s to the mid-1990s. The extraordinarily detailed and 
carefully constructed OECD EPL measures were available for just two data points: “the late 
1980s” and “the late 1990s.” From these two estimates for each country, Blanchard and 
Wolfers created another for 1990-94 by interpolating between the OECD’s late 1980s and 
late 1990s scores, and still another for the early 1980s simply by using the late 1980s figures, 
on the grounds that they did not have information to suggest that there were any changes 
between the early and late 1980s. Thus, from two multi-year averages for the late 1980s and 
late 1990s (OECD), four 5-year averages were created.   
  Blanchard and Wolfers (2000) then the Lazear data to do the same for the first two 
decades (1960s and 1970s). But the Lazear and OECD measures are quite different, an issue 
not addressed by either Blanchard-Wolfers or the many subsequent studies that also relied on 
this EPL series. For the late 1980s and late 1990s, the OECD (1999) took into account three 
dimensions of employment protection: “procedural inconveniences which the employer faces 
when trying to dismiss; notice and severance pay provisions; and prevailing standards of and 
penalties for unfair dismissal.” Further, their estimates were designed to cover both white and 
blue collar workers. In contrast, Lazear's index is narrowly confined to just one of the three 
OECD dimensions, severance pay and notice, and was further limited to “the number of 
months of severance pay or notice a blue collar worker with ten years of service received 
upon termination without ‘cause’” (emphasis added, p. 707-8). 
  By merging the OECD and Lazear series, Blanchard and Wolfers produced an EPL 
measure for 5-year periods from the early 1960s to the late 1990s. Nickell et al. (2001, 2003, 
2005) then annualized these data by simple interpolation. For consistency and lack of an 
alternative, this mongrel EPL measure was then used (either in its annual or 5-year format) 
for the tests published by many of the most influential subsequent studies, including the IMF 
(2003), Belot and van Ours (2004), Baker et al. (2004 and 2005), and Baccaro and Rei 
(2005). In contrast, the Bassanini-Duval (2006) employs what must be a far superior annual 
EPL series that has recently been generated by the OECD, in large part because they limit the 
analysis to the post 1982 period.     12
  Again, due to the efforts of the OECD, the quality and comparability of unemployment 
benefits data for OECD countries improved dramatically after the mid-1990s.  The OECD 
produces an average gross replacement rate (across family types, income levels, and for 
different durations of unemployment) for every second year since 1961 and this has become 
the measure of choice for empirical work in this area. This measure allows researchers to 
capture both the replacement rate and duration in a single measure of benefit generosity.  
  More recently, the OECD has constructed net replacement rates, which take into account 
unemployment compensation after taxes and various related benefits. These are far more 
appropriate than the gross replacement rates for measuring the incentives facing workers. Net 
replacement rates have been constructed for selected dates between the early 1990s and 2003, 
but the OECD is only now (2006) coming out with a historical time series. These new net 
benefit figures are particularly attractive because they will measure generosity relative to 
average wages, not the average production worker wage (which, with the shift to services, is 
increasingly misleading).  The question is whether the new, much improved measures of 
benefit generosity will perform as well as the average gross replacement rate in regression 
tests (section 4). 
  There is some reason for doubt. Currently, these new net replacement rates can be 
compared over time for just 8 of the countries typically included in cross-country tests, and 
only for 1995-2004. If changes in the standard gross replacement rate are good measures of 
the change in benefit generosity likely to have major effects on labor supply decisions and 
wage pressure (and therefore on employment and unemployment rates), they should be 
closely correlated with the new and superior net replacement rates. It turns out that there is 
little correspondence between the two. Three countries show changes roughly similar in 
magnitudes, France (NRR: +4 pts; GRR: +2), Austria (NRR: -2; GRR: -1), and the UK 
(NRR: -1; GRR: -2). But three other countries show changes in opposite directions: the U.S. 
(NRR: -6; GRR: +2); Japan (NRR: +2; GRR: -2); and Germany (NRR: +1; GRR: -3). The 
two remaining countries show huge differences in the size of the change: Italy (NRR: +2; 
GRR: +15) and Finland (NRR: -9: GRR: 0).
10 These are not results that give us much 
confidence that when the improved net rates become available for the full set of 19 OECD 
countries, the measured change in benefit generosity will show a close correspondence to   13
changes in the measure that many studies have found associated with changes in 
unemployment.  
  But even a net replacement rate measure that reflects both levels and the duration of 
benefit relative to the average wage, other critical features of unemployment benefit systems 
are left unmeasured. There is no cross-country measure of eligibility, but we know that the 
share of the unemployed who are receiving unemployment-related benefits varies 
dramatically across countries. For example, younger workers, who in many countries account 
for a large part of the unemployment problem and who may be most sensitive to work 
incentives, may be either ineligible for benefits in the first place (e.g., Spain and Italy) or are 
eligible only for much lower levels of benefit. Closely related, enforcement of eligibility 
rules is a critical dimension of benefit generosity, but there is no reliable historical series that 
can be used for cross-country comparisons.  
  Finally, the bargaining power workers gain from trade union led collective action is 
poorly measured. The most commonly used measure is union density – the share of 
employees who are union members. But union density is not closely correlated with 
collective bargaining coverage – the share of employees whose wages and employment 
conditions are set through collective bargaining. The most extreme example is France, which 
had a union density rate of just 10% in 2000, below that of even the U.S. (13%), but a 
collective bargaining coverage rate of over 90 percent. Countries with less than 40 percent 
union density and more than 80 percent collective coverage included Austria, Australia, 
Portugal Spain and The Netherlands. The coverage measure is much harder to produce, 
which helps explain why it is available for fewer countries and many fewer years than the 
union density measure. In any case, it is not clear that a perfectly measured union coverage 
rate would be a particularly good measure of the power of unions to affect market outcomes. 
This skepticism is suggested by the fairly robust finding that bargaining coordination is 
associated with lower unemployment (see section 4), which is usually interpreted as 
indicating that the bargainers have incorporated the effect of wage bargains on employment 
in their bargaining objectives.  
  Given these considerable inadequacies in measurement on both sides of the relationship 
– for the unemployment rate as well as the key labor market institutions – it might be viewed 
to be surprising if any statistical fit was uncovered. Interestingly, as Section 4 (Table 3) will   14
show, as the quality of the labor market institution measures has improved, the strength of 
the reported statistical association between these measures and the pattern of unemployment 
has fallen. This may reflect some combination of Blanchard’s “Darwinian” effect in the early 
literature (the measures that best produce results consistent with particular theoretical 
expectations are the ones finally used), the use of improved econometric techniques, and the 
much greater attention to robustness in recent studies.    
 
3. Correlation Evidence 
   3.1 Casual Associations 
  Where the conventional wisdom is so dominant that there is no competing account to 
speak of, the standards for evidence are likely to suffer. This may explain the frequent resort 
to casual association in making the case for the orthodox rigidity explanation. The OECD’s 
Jobs Study offers an example. Although no evidence of a statistically significant relationship 
between unemployment benefit generosity and unemployment is presented for any particular 
point in time, Chapter 5 of the Jobs Study states confidently that “increases in a more 
comprehensive measure of unemployment compensation has typically been followed by an 
increase in unemployment but usually with a considerable lag” (p. 44). Support for this 
conclusion on lagged effects is provided in Chapter 8, and two kinds of evidence are 
presented. We consider the first one here, in which unemployment increases are explained by 
earlier increases in unemployment benefits (the replacement rate). According to Chapter 8 of 
the Jobs Study (OECD 1994, p. 178):  
In some countries, there have been major reforms in benefit entitlements which give 
some more specific idea of how long lags may be. In Canada, entitlements rose in 
1972 and unemployment rose unusually in 1978 and more strongly around 1983. In 
Finland, entitlements rose in 1972 and unemployment rose sharply (in contrast to its 
Scandinavian neighbors) through to 1978; in Ireland, changes increasing entitlements 
occurred over 1971 to 1985, and its rise in unemployment was particularly large (as 
compared to other European countries) from 1980 to 1985. In Norway, major 
increases in entitlements occurred in 1975 and 1984 (although also before and after 
these dates), and unemployment rose exceptionally around 1989. Entitlements rose in 
Sweden in 1974 and in Switzerland in 1977, with major rises in unemployment in 
1991 in both cases. These experiences suggest lags between rises in entitlements and 
later sharp rises in unemployment of 5-10 years for Canada, Ireland and Finland but 
perhaps 10 to 20 years in Norway, Sweden and Switzerland.  
   15
  Such breathtaking leaps in association must require extremely strong theoretical priors. 
As Manning (1998, p. 144) puts it, “I think that we would all agree that this is absurd. In fact, 
one could write a very similar paragraph relating performance in the Eurovision Song 
Contest to unemployment.” 
  To take another example, Heckman (2003, p. 373) suggests that an important part of the 
German employment performance problem can be traced to what he terms “substantial” 
unemployment net benefit replacement rates (79%), because “Germans, like all people, 
respond to these incentives (not to work).” More substantial evidence of a causal relationship 
running from benefits to unemployment for Germany is not offered. Although it goes 
unmentioned, Heckman’s figure also shows that Denmark (80%), the Netherlands (82%), 
Switzerland (84%) and Sweden (85%) all had higher net replacement rate generosity than 
Germany (1995). But unemployment rates for these four high generosity countries have 
consistently been lower than Germany’s since 1995. Three of the four (Sweden is the 
exception, but just barely) have shown lower unemployment rates than the U.S. since the late 
1990s, despite a much lower U.S. net replacement rate.  
  Similar reliance on casual association can be found in discussion of the labor market 
effects of employment protection laws. The OECD’s Economic Survey of France (OECD 
2005b) notes that employment protection is relatively strict in France and, for this reason, 
calls for a series of reforms. But no evidence or references are offered to establish that EPL 
strictness actually helps explain French unemployment, or that the recommended reforms 
would reduce it. Similarly, the OECD’s Economic Survey of the Netherlands (OECD 2005c, 
p. 25) recommends “increasing the responsiveness of employment to economic conditions by 
easing strict EPL or regular contracts, (and) making real wages even more responsive to 
unemployment by phasing down unemployment benefit replacement rates as unemployment 
spells lengthen.” As in the French country survey, this policy recommendation for the 
Netherlands (a very low unemployment country) is made without reference to any evidence 
on the links between either EPL strictness and employment responsiveness or benefit 
replacement rates and the responsiveness of real wages to unemployment.  
 
   3.2 Simple Correlations   16
  Between these examples of assumed relationships based, presumably, on theoretical 
common-sense, and the macroeconometric exercises that we review below, lie simple 
bivariate correlations, most commonly represented by scatter plots. One would expect that if 
the expected effects of protective labor market institutions on employment performance are 
as direct and strong as commonly believed, we should observe some evidence of it with 
simple correlations. Indeed, scatter plots have been frequently employed to show the links 
between unemployment and various labor market institutions. 
  For instance, it has been argued that extended duration of generous benefits will have 
particularly strong effects on long-term unemployment. Layard et al. (1994) put particular 
emphasis on this source of the unemployment crisis: “The unconditional payment of benefits 
for an indefinite period is clearly a major cause of high European unemployment” (p. 92, 
italics in the original). The authors present a plot of a measure of the maximum duration of 
benefit in years against the long-term share of unemployment for the mid-1980s (1991, 
Figure 13; 1994, Figure 13) and remark that “all the countries where long-term 
unemployment has escalated have unemployment benefits of some kind that are available for 
a very long period, rather than running out after 6 months (as in the USA) or 14 months (as in 
Sweden)” (p. 59). This evidence leads to their conclusion that “In countries in which benefits 
are indefinitely available, employment is much less likely to rebound after a major 
downwards shock” (1991, p. 40; 1994, p. 62). As we noted above, Atkinson and 
Micklewright (1991) have been quite critical of these “indefinite duration” measures of 
benefits. 
  Other examples appear in the published literature. Heckman (2003) presents several 
scatter plots showing a negative relationship between employment rates and the strictness of 
employment protection laws. In another example, Blanchard (2004) has used scatter plots of 
cooperation in labor relations in the late 1990s against unemployment to suggest the 
importance of the quality of labor relations for labor market performance.   
 The  OECD’s  Jobs Study made frequent use of scatter plot and simple correlation 
evidence. After the passage linking increasing unemployment to increases in benefit 
generosity quoted above, Chapter 8 proposes to “examine correlations more systematically” 
(p. 178). Here they show scatter plots of “cycle-to-cycle changes in unemployment rates and 
the summary measure of benefit entitlements” (p. 180). For three periods (1973-77, 1979-85,   17
and 1987-93) the OECD presents scatter plots for the change in unemployment against the 6-
year average (“summary”) benefits level as well as against the change in the benefits measure 
over the previous cycle. This produces 6 correlation tests. They do this both for a full set of 
21 countries and for a reduced set of 14 countries, on the grounds that standardized 
unemployment data were unavailable for 7 of the 21 countries before the 1980s, resulting in a 
total of 12 tests. They find that “In data for 21 countries, none of the individual correlations 
are statistically significant at the 5 percent level.” For the 14-country data, two of the six tests 
produce the expected positive correlation: 1973-77 using the level of benefit entitlements 
measure, and 1987-93 using the change in benefits measure.
11 In sum, this is the correlation 
evidence that supports the OECD’s Chapter 5 contention that increases in unemployment 
tends to follow increases in unemployment compensation (see above).   
   It turns out that as a general rule, simple cross-country correlations between  
unemployment and the standard measures of the key labor market institutions offer little 
support for the orthodox account. Using five-year averages for the 1980s and 1990s for 20 
OECD countries, Baker et al. (2005) found no statistical association between unemployment 
and OECD measures of employment protection laws, unemployment benefit replacement 
rates, the duration of unemployment benefits, union density or union coverage.   
  To further illustrate what the correlation evidence shows, we present some simple scatter 
plots of unemployment and various measures of unemployment benefit entitlement 
generosity. We limit these to benefit entitlements both for reasons of space and because our 
survey of the regression literature (below) indicates that the benefit system is the single labor 
market institution with the strongest and most robust unemployment-increasing effects.   
   If unemployment benefit entitlement generosity is one of the key institutions at the root 
of unemployment, the strongest evidence should appear with the use of the OECD’s net 
replacement measure of unemployment benefits. Net benefit is measured as the after-tax 
value of unemployment assistance and other social assistance, such as housing and child 
support. The net replacement rate takes this after-tax measure as a share of after-tax 
household earnings. If workers are calculating the tradeoff between the dole and work, such 
an after-tax measure is clearly the most appropriate.  Figure 2 shows that there is, indeed, a 
relationship, but it is perverse: in 2002, more generous after-tax benefits (measured as the 
overall average over 60 months for two earnings levels and three family types) is associated   18
with lower unemployment across these 20 countries. As the figure shows, Italy is an outlier 
(it offers no benefits after the first phase of unemployment), but even without Italy there is a 
negative relationship. The figure shows eleven countries (in two groups) with unemployment 
below the US in 2002 but with net replacement rates more than twice as high (60-80% vs 
30%). With data from an OECD paper by John Martin (1996), we also found a negative 
relationship for 1994/5 (not shown).   
  Long duration of benefits is also expected to help explain high unemployment. Figure 3 
shows benefit duration plotted against unemployment, with duration measured as the ratio of 
the net replacement rate in the 60
th month of benefit receipts to the “initial phase” on the 
entitlement (effectively the 1
st month). This duration measure can be greater than one 
because for the generally smaller group still eligible for assistance in the 60
th month, more 
kinds of social assistance may be available than in the initial phase. The data are shown for 
2001, the most recent data available for short and long term net replacement rates. Figure 3 
shows that higher levels of benefit duration are associated with lower unemployment. Spain 
and Italy offered relatively ungenerous long term benefits but have high unemployment; 
Ireland, Denmark, the UK and Austria had similar or lower unemployment than the U.S., but 
much more generous long-term unemployment-linked net benefits. 
   As noted above, Layard et al. (1991, 1994) argue that there is a close fit between benefit 
entitlement duration and long-term unemployment. Figure 4 shows a plot of long-term 
unemployment against the same duration measure used in Figure 3. The data again fail to 
show the predicted positive association between benefit generosity and unemployment. 
Germany and Belgium show high net benefit duration and high long term unemployment, but 
Ireland, the UK, New Zealand, Denmark and Austria are at least as generous with much 
lower shares of long-term unemployment. Italy has no long term benefits, but has the highest 
level of long-term unemployment. 
  A number of the most influential panel data studies that we survey below have focused 
on the extent to which changes in labor market institutions can account in a substantial way 
for changes in the pattern of unemployment across countries (e.g., Nickell et al., 2005).  
Along these lines, changes in benefit duration generosity might be expected to be associated 
with changes in long-term unemployment. Figure 5 explores this possibility for the 1991-
2001 period (the longest period the available data permit). The data show no correlation. The   19
Netherlands and Norway experienced large declines in both duration and long term 
unemployment, but Ireland had the largest decline in unemployment at the same time that it 
had the largest increase in benefit duration. Although Canada had the largest decline in 
duration of benefits, its share of long-term unemployment showed little change.   
  The benefits measure used in nearly all of the recent time series regression tests is the 
average gross replacement rate, for which there are now measures from 1961 to 2003. The 
change in this measure has typically been found to be significantly associated with the 
change in unemployment (see below). Figure 6 shows that the simple correlation between the 
1982-2002 percentage point change in unemployment and the gross replacement rate has the 
expected positive sign. Many countries show small changes in the benefits replacement rate 
(both up and down) and large changes in unemployment (from -7 percentage points for 
Ireland to +3 points for Japan). In Section 5 we will return to the question of how much 
weight ought to be assigned to these changes in the gross replacement rate.  
   
4. Macroeconometric Evidence   
   4.1 The Consensus View: Centrality of Labor Market Institutions  
  As employment performance across much of Europe worsened, economists turned their 
attention to the links between institutions, rigidities, and unemployment (Bruno and Sachs, 
1984?; Blanchard and Summers, 1986; Lindbeck and Snower, 1988). This early research, in 
turn, spawned a rapidly growing literature aimed at explaining both cross-country differences 
in unemployment and the evolution of these differences over time with regression tests. The 
most influential studies share the same broad conclusion: in the final analysis, the evidence 
offers support for the orthodox theoretical expectation that labor market institutions have 
played a key role in cross-country unemployment differences. For example:  
•  “Thus, with six institutional variables plus the change in inflation, we can explain 
over 90 per cent of the differences in unemployment between countries” (Layard, 
Nickell and Jackman, 1994, p. 82). 
  
•  “The broad empirical conclusions suggest that policy variables (labor market 
institutions) and the institutional mechanisms of wage determination do matter for the 
level of structural unemployment as well as for the speed of labour market adjustment 
in the OECD countries” (Scarpetta, 1996, p. 45). 
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•  “This paper has identified a number of policy settings and institutional features of the 
labour market which are associated with high structural unemployment… (we) assign 
significant roles to unemployment benefits, collective bargaining structures, active 
labour market policies … and the tax wedge…. It requires strong political will and 
leadership to convince electorates that it is necessary to swallow all of the 
(deregulation) medicine and that it will take time before this treatment leads to 
improved labour market performance and falling unemployment. But the success 
stories show that it can be done!” (Elmeskov et al., 1998, pp   ) 
 
•  “To sum up, reductions in replacement rates, lower tax wedges, liberalized 
employment protection regulations, and improved active labor market policies remain 
essential ingredients of a comprehensive labor market strategy geared to reducing 
Europe’s high structural unemployment rate” (IMF, 2003, p. 141). 
 
•   “Our results indicate … (that) broad movements in unemployment across the OECD 
can be explained by shifts in labour market institutions” (Nickell et al., 2005, p. 22).    
 
  In the next several sections (4.2-4.4), we survey a number of influential cross-country 
econometric studies for the purpose of assessing the consistency and robustness of the 
findings. The case for treating protective labor market institutions as the principal 
determinants of high unemployment will be stronger the more consistent the findings are 
across studies and the more care taken to ensure that the published results are robust. Table 3 
provides a summary of the implied effects of changes in eight of the most commonly 
employed institutional measures from eleven panel data regression studies published since 
1996. While broadly representative, this is by no means a comprehensive list. In some cases 
studies were not included because it was difficult to make comparable the implied effects. 
ayed by labor market institutions in the striking decline in UK unemployment in the 1990s. 
  
   4.2 Early OECD Studies 
  In “Key Lessons for Labor Market Reforms,” Elmeskov, Martin and Scarpetta (1998) 
(hereafter, EMS) aim to “distill the main lessons for labour market reforms from the 
(country) “successes” and “failures” revealed by recent OECD research” (p. 1). The authors, 
three senior OECD economists, note that their econometric work is “essentially an update 
and extension” of Scarpetta’s (1996) earlier work. As Table 3 shows, both Scarpetta and 
EMS find a significant effect of EPL and unemployment benefit replacement rates, but differ 
on union density (significant for Scarpetta but not for EMS), the tax wedge (significant for   21
EMS but not Scarpetta) and  bargaining coordination (same direction, but the implied effect 
is twice as large in Scarpetta).  
  These rather substantial differences are not addressed in the EMS paper, which is notable 
since the results of these exercises have been highly influential for the way other researchers 
and policy makers understand the sources of poor employment performance.  Indeed, 
Elmeskov et al. (1998, p. 2) point to the key role played by Scarpetta’s regression results: 
“The OECD work since 1994 has produced a series of additional publications…. This work 
has enabled the Organization to identify a number of country “success stories” as well as 
“failures” in terms of implementing the OECD recommendations and the resulting labour 
market outcomes. In assessing the needs for reform, the work has relied heavily on the 
econometric work of Scarpetta (1996)…”. If this influential work is found to be inconsistent 
in a substantial way with the same author’s work a few years later (in EMS, 1998), it would 
do readers, particularly researchers and policy makers, a considerable service to highlight and 
explain the differences. EMS compare their findings only to those of Nickell and Layard 
(1997), noting that while generally similar, the findings for EPL are inconsistent (Nickell and 
Layard find no significant effect).  
  
 4.3 Other Early Cross-Country Tests 
  In many papers and books published in the 1990s, Nickell (in many cases with Layard) 
reported results from relatively simple cross-country regressions based on the same grouped 
data (1984-89, 1989-94). The results shown in row 3 of Table 3 for Nickell (1997) are 
representative. Although all the variables except EPL are strongly significant with the 
expected sign, his conclusion in this paper is cautious: “It is clear that the broad-brush 
analysis that says that European unemployment is high because European labor markets are 
“rigid” is too vague and probably misleading.” 
  Baker et al. (2005) explored the sensitivity of the main results in Nickell's influential 
(1997) paper to newer versions of the institutional variables. We replaced six of the eight 
institutional variables used in the 1997 tests with improved measures that were employed by 
the same author in more recent work (Nickell et al., 2003; 2005). We also used alternative 
measures of union coverage (from Blanchard and Wolfers, 2000) and active labor market 
policies (OECD).
12  With these newer versions of the same institutional measures, the   22
regression produces markedly different results. In Nickell (1997), seven of the eight 
institutional variables had the expected sign and were statistically significant at standard 
levels. The only exception was the employment protection variable, which was close to zero 
and not statistically significant. With the new data, only union coverage is significant (at the 
10 percent level), and three of the remaining seven institutional variables have the wrong 
sign.
13  
  In the late 1990s, a number of empirical studies appeared that improved upon the 
Nickell/Layard institutional measures, added others, changed the time period covered, and 
experimented with the specification and econometric method (see Baker et al., 2005, for a 
detailed review of this literature). Among the most influential, Blanchard and Wolfers (2000) 
(BW) shifted the focus of the empirical tests from simple institution effects in panel data 
cross-sections to the interaction of institutions with macroeconomic shocks. The idea, which 
had in fact been around for some time, was that labor market institutions may produce higher 
unemployment by limiting the ability of labor markets to respond to adverse shocks, and that 
this can help explain why the same institutions were not employment-unfriendly in previous 
decades. The BW study was also distinguished by a much longer time period (8 five-year 
periods from 1960 to 1996; the last two years are treated as a full period), and while it relies 
heavily on Nickell’s institutional measures, it also employs  alternative, OECD-generated 
measures of benefit replacement rates and employment protection laws that varied over time. 
While Nickell (1997) and Blanchard-Wolfers (2000) (BW) show broadly similar results for 
the two unemployment benefit measures, union density, coordination, and taxes, this is not 
the case for EPL (BW get an unemployment-increasing effect), ALMP and bargaining 
coordination (both insignificant for BW). 
  Using Nickell’s (1997) time invariant measures of institutions (the average for 1983-88 
and 1989-94) and accounting for time and country effects, Blanchard and Wolfers obtained 
results for the entire 1960-96 period that were similar to Nickell’s for the late 1980s and early 
1990s. But the authors point out that the results are quite sensitive to the specification. 
Indeed, it appears that the use of alternative, arguably much superior OECD-generated 
measures of unemployment benefit replacement rates and employment protection laws 
actually weaken the results. According to the authors, the table showing these results 
“suggests two conclusions, both worrisome: replacing the Nickell measures by alternative,   23
but still time invariant measures, substantially decreases the R
2. Going from the time 
invariant to the time varying measures further decreases the fit.”  
  For example, in a regression that uses alternative measures of benefit replacement rates 
from the OECD (the average 1985-89 value), the employment protection and tax wedge 
variables become insignificant, while union density is only significant at a 10 percent 
confidence level (Blanchard and Wolfers, 2000, table 6, column 1). Further, when the time 
series version of the same OECD replacement rate measure is used (as it clearly should be), 
all three of these variables become insignificant, as do the two replacement rate variables 
themselves (table 6, column 2). But in regressions that use an alternative, time-varying 
measures of employment protection, the replacement rate, benefit duration, tax wedge, and 
union density variables all become highly significant (table 6, columns 3 and 4). It is worth 
emphasizing that only bargaining coordination (a “good” labor market institution) has a 
significant coefficient in every regression, regardless of specification. 
   Belot and van Ours (2002; 2005) shift the focus to the roles played by interactions 
among labor market institutions. They report the results of seven regressions, four of which 
test just the direct impact of institutions on unemployment, while the last three include 
various interacted measures. Their four direct impact tests differ only in that they include 
different combinations of fixed time and country effects (column 1 shows results with neither 
time nor country effects; column 4 shows results when both are included), but the results are 
dramatically different.  
  While it should be recognized that their objective is to use the differences across tests to 
show the importance of interactions among institutions (shown in the last three tests in their 
Table 7), these differences across tests 1-4 serve to highlight how sensitive the results for 
each institutional measure is to the other variables included in the test. For example, the 
benefits replacement rate has the expected sign and is strongly significant in the first test, the 
right sign but not significant in their second and third tests, and has the wrong sign in their 
fourth test. When the three interacted variables are introduced, the direct effect of the 
replacement rate is large and significant with the wrong sign (it is unemployment-reducing). 
The coefficients on employment protection have the wrong sign (it reduces unemployment) 
in all six tests in which it appears, with substantial variation in the size of both the coefficient 
and the level of statistical significance.   24
 
 4.4 Explaining Changes over Time with Annual Data  
  Following earlier OECD research (Scarpetta, 1996; Elmeskov, 1998), Nickell and 
colleagues (Nickell et al., 2001; 2003; 2005) shift to the use of annual data to explain the 
change in the pattern of unemployment with time-varying measures of institutions, extending 
the analysis back to 1961. As noted above (Section 2), the use of annual data extended back 
to the 1960s and 1970s raises serious concerns about the historical consistency of the 
unemployment time series and the meaningfulness of annual changes in the institutional 
measures (due to the quality of the measurements, the heavy reliance on interpolation, and 
the typical small or non-existent year-to-year changes in most of the institutions under 
investigation). What is clear is that increasing the number of observations will increase the 
degrees of freedom and thus reduce the apparent standard errors of the estimated coefficients.  
There has been little effort to justify this use of long annual time series and it is notable that 
the most recent work by the OECD has been much more conservative in this regard, limiting 
the span covered to 1982-2003. 
  The Nickell et al. tests are distinguished by the use of a lagged dependent variable and 
country specific time trends, arguing that their inclusion “is to ensure that the estimated 
coefficients on the institution variables are not distorted by omitted trended variables in each 
country or common shocks” (2005, p. 15). The use of country trends is of interest since it 
implies that important secular movements in the unemployment rate have occurred in the 
absence of changes in key labor-market institutions. While the paper notes that most of the 
estimated coefficients for these trends are not close to being statistically significant, because 
of the presence of a lagged dependent variable, the trends actually account for much of the 
change in unemployment in many countries.
14 If the magnitudes of their estimates are taken 
at face value, the question becomes why the mainstream research program has failed to focus 
on explaining these underlying country trends.   
   Because Nickell et al. (2005) include a lagged dependent variable (the unemployment 
rate), their estimates of the unemployment impact of various labor market institutions have a 
long-run multiplier effect and the implied effects shown in Table 3 reflect this by assuming a 
five-year horizon (the implied effects after 5 years). Nickell et al. finds that the replacement 
ratio, benefit duration, and employment tax variables have positive significant effects. Unlike   25
previous studies, Nickell et al. replace the standard union density measure (for which they 
fail to get a significant effect in the 2001 version) with the change in union density, which 
gets the expected positive and significant effect (a 10% increase in union density produces a 
.3 percentage point increase in unemployment after 5 years). Unlike the Scarpetta and 
Elmeskov et al. studies, however, they find no effect for EPL. Consistent with much of this 
literature, Nickell et al. find that higher levels of bargaining coordination significantly reduce 
unemployment. 
   Nickell et al.’s study (2005) offers another example of rather large effects of what appear 
to be fairly minor changes, this time across different versions of the same basic paper. The 
main difference between the published versions (2003; 2005) and the original working paper 
(2001) appears to be the replacement of the level of union density with its change and the 
addition of three years to the time series (ending with 1995 instead of 1992). The 
consequences are substantial: the effect of EPL on unemployment changes from highly 
significant to small and insignificant; the level of union density was insignificant but its 
change becomes highly significant. In addition, the new version reports much smaller effects 
of taxes, coordination, and benefit duration, but a larger effect for the unemployment benefit 
replacement rate. It is also notable that these seemingly minor changes in specification 
change the coefficient of the interest rate variable from insignificant to significant. 
Particularly given the strong conclusions and implications for public policy (that shifts in 
labor market institutions explain movements in unemployment), it is notable that there is no 
discussion of robustness.   
  Using Nickell et al. (2001) as their starting point, researchers at the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF, 2003) addressed the same question – the effects of changes in 
institutions on changes in unemployment - with much the same data but with some notable 
differences in specification.
15 The IMF (2003) finds a strong unemployment-increasing effect 
for EPL (like Scarpetta and Elmeskov et al., but unlike Nickell, Belot and van Ours, and 
Nickell et al.). The IMF also identifies a large effect for union density, which is more than 
seven times larger than the Nickell et al. (2005) estimate. Interestingly, they also find, in 
contrast to Nickell et al., that labor taxes tend to significantly reduce unemployment. 
   By reporting four alternative specifications, the IMF report illustrates the difficulty of 
making generalizations about the effects of labor market institutions from cross-country   26
regression. The implied impact of given changes in labor market institutions for each of their 
four alternative specifications are shown in Table 4.
16 There are several differences in results 
across these tests worth noting:  
•  The results in column 1 imply that the impact of employment protection is almost three 
times as large as the results shown in column 3, whereas the results shown in the fourth 
column actually indicate that increased employment protection leads to lower 
unemployment.  
  
•  In column 1, increases in bargaining coordination at levels below the cross-country mean 
are found to substantially reduce unemployment; more modest reductions are implied by 
the results shown in second and third columns; and the fourth test (the one used for the 
simulations in the paper) implies that higher levels of bargaining coordination has 
essentially no effect on the unemployment rate. 
 
•  The implied impact of changes in union density has the same sign in all four sets of 
regression results, but the magnitude of the implied impact varies substantially. The 
results from the regression shown in column 2 imply an impact of changes in union 
density that is nearly twenty times as large as the results from the regression in column 4. 
 
•  Only the coefficients for the unemployment benefit replacement rate variable are roughly 
similar across the four regressions, but only in variant 4 is the coefficient statistically 
significant (at just the 10% level).  
 
  With nearly identical data, Baker et al. (2004) further explored the robustness of the 
IMF’s results. After replicating the results of the IMF's three most important specifications, 
we ran an alternative based on a composite of specifications used in earlier research in this 
area. The alternative specification differs from the IMF variants in using common time 
dummies, rather than country-specific time trends.
17 It also included a somewhat different set 
of institutional variables and interactions: slight differences (improvements) in the union 
density, the benefit replacement ratio, and the tax wedge measures (typically involving 
changes to a few countries in a few years); an additional variable for the duration of benefits; 
and two new interaction variables – one interaction between benefit duration and the benefit 
replacement rate, and another between the tax wedge and bargaining coordination. In this 
alternative test, we found only one of the direct institutional variables to be statistically 
significant (the tax wedge, at the 10% level).  
  To the extent that the relationships posited in the original IMF model are true in the 
levels of unemployment and labor-market institutions, these relationships should also hold in   27
changes in unemployment and labor-market institutions.
18 In this alternative specification, 
only union density and bargaining coordination have a statistically significant effect on 
unemployment. Employment protection, benefit replacement, the tax wedge, and the 
interactions terms have no statistically discernible impact on the cross-country pattern of 
unemployment. In sum, minor changes to a few variables and reasonable changes in 
specification produce results that show no meaningful relationship between labor-market 
institutions and unemployment.   
  Baccaro and Rei (2005), in turn, build on the methods and data used by Nickell et al. 
(2001) and the IMF (2003). But Baccaro and Rei are distinctive in this literature for their 
extreme attention to robustness, exploring both static and dynamic models, yearly vs. 
averaged data, numerous alternative estimation techniques, and a myriad of variable 
specifications. For example, they point out that “We started off with dynamic fixed effects 
models in levels using yearly data. We then shifted to dynamic models in first differences 
with yearly data. We then grouped our data in five-year averages and estimated fixed effects 
models in levels, random effects models in levels, as well as models in first differences (p. 
40). No fewer than 72 tests are presented in 12 tables.  
  Although many of these tests were quite similar to those published by Nickell et al. and 
the IMF, essentially the same data produced dramatically different results (see Table 3). 
Baccaro and Rei (2005, p. 44) conclude that  
 “Changes in employment protection, benefit replacement rates, and (the) tax wedge 
seem negatively associated with changes in Unemployment, even though the 
coefficients are (mostly but not always) insignificant. The one institutional variable 
we find to be positively associated with changes in unemployment is the union 
density change variable…. What transpires from these findings is that unemployment 
is mostly increased by policies and institutions that lead to restrictive macroeconomic 
policies… the claim that systematic deregulation of labour markets would solve the 
unemployment problem faced by several advanced countries appears unwarranted 
based on our results.”   
 
   As of this writing, the latest entry is the OECD’s effort to reassess the Jobs Study, which 
comes shortly after its 10
th anniversary. The relevant empirical analysis appears in Bassanini 
and Duval (2006), which forms the basis for Chapter 7 of the OECD’s 2006 Employment 
Outlook (OECD 2006). This research uses the latest OECD data (in annual form), which is 
particularly significant for two measures: EPL, which for the first time is a truly annual series   28
(not just interpolated from a small number of years for which the OECD had estimates); and 
product market regulation, a measure that has been developed very recently (but covers just 
seven non-manufacturing industries). The authors control for cyclical effects with a measure 
of the output gap, and control for both time and country effects. Unlike Nickell et al. (2005), 
these OECD tests do not include lagged unemployment as an explanatory variable. Like 
Baccaro and Rei (2005), it is notable that the authors pay considerable attention to the 
robustness of the results. 
  We focus here only on their “baseline” test. Four institution and policy variables are 
found to be highly significant in the predicted (orthodox) direction: the benefit replacement 
rate (a summary measure of benefit generosity), the tax wedge on labor incomes, high 
corporatism (highly centralized or coordinated bargaining), and the strictness of product 
market regulation. Thus, among labor market institutions typically blamed for poor labor 
market performance, only the unemployment benefits replacement rate is found to have a 
significant effect. As the authors put it, a key policy conclusion is that “high unemployment 
benefits are found to amplify the unemployment effects of adverse shocks” (p. 36).  
  This analysis, as careful and comprehensive as it is, leaves many key policy-relevant 
questions unanswered. While the “risk of reverse causality” is briefly acknowledged, the 
authors simply note that “there is no straightforward way to address this issue” (OECD 2006, 
p. 11). This is of particular concern for the interpretation of the estimated coefficients on both 
unemployment benefits and the tax wedge. Like all the studies we have surveyed, the text or 
this report implies that significant coefficients reflect causal relationships that run from 
benefit generosity and the size of the tax wedge to the level of unemployment. Obviously, for 
policy purposes establishing that the effects run in this direction, and to what extent, is 
critically important.     
 
4.5 Time Series Evidence from the UK 
A number of studies have attempted to explain long run trends in unemployment with 
country-specific time series tests. Perhaps the most extensive work has been done on the 
U.K., which has experienced large swings in unemployment, sharp declines in union 
membership and power, and fairly substantial labor market deregulation.
19 It is worth a brief   29
detour to see what the time series evidence says about the role played by protective labor 
market institutions for UK unemployment.  
Extending his earlier work on Britain (Nickell, 1988; Nickell and Bell, 1995),  Nickell 
(1998) accounts for changes from 1964 to 1992 with measures of industrial turbulence, the 
replacement ratio, terms of trade, skill mismatch, the union mark-up and the real interest rate. 
It is notable that the benefit replacement rate is not significant and the union power accounts 
for 19 percent of the overall rise in unemployment. But Nickell judges the equation as a 
qualified success, since it “comfortably explains the four fold rise in unemployment... 
Despite the fact that it seems quite easy to explain long-run trends in unemployment in 
Britain using wage pressure variables, there remains a feeling of dissatisfaction. Seven 
variables is a lot, so it is hard to tell a simple story. And, because of this, many remain 
unpersuaded” (p. 815). 
  Several more recent studies have had a harder time explaining the trend in UK 
unemployment. Henry and Nixon (2000) extend Nickell (1998) and find that UK 
unemployment can be well-explained not by institutional measures but by a small number of 
transitory shock variables: oil prices, terms of trade, and real interest rates. More recently, 
Henry (2004) finds that wage pressure variables do not explain the UK experience: “To 
summarise the overall findings reported in the tables above, these show that the labour 
supply variables (institutions) do not figure strongly in the behaviour of wages and 
employment.
20 Similarly, focusing on the 1960-98 period, a Bank of England study (Cassino 
and Thornton, 2002, p. 34) concludes that  
A wide range of equations with different combinations of structural variables was 
examined.  Overall, the estimation work has shown that it is extremely difficult to 
link movements in the natural rate to structural economic variables. It is generally 
difficult to derive robust coefficient estimates for structural variables that have the 
expected sign and are statistically significant.” 
  
  In sum, the recent time series evidence suggests that the deregulation of the UK’s labor 
market accounts for little if any of the observed changes in unemployment since the 1970s. 
  
   4.6 Assessment 
  Not surprisingly, the two most recent studies we have considered, Baccaro and Rei 
(2005) and Bassanini and Duval (2006), have taken advantage of the availability of improved   30
institutional measures and methodological innovations of earlier studies. But they are also 
characterized by paying much more attention to issues of robustness. It is notable, therefore, 
that these latest studies have each found much less support for the orthodox rigidity view 
than the earlier studies. For example, Scarpetta (1996) finds significant effects for EPL, the 
replacement rate, and union density, and Nickell (1997) finds the same for the replacement 
rate, benefit duration, union density and union coverage. In contrast, with better data and 
more apparent attention to robustness issues, among protective labor market institutions, 
Baccaro-Rei and Bassanini-Duval find just one measure of protective labor market 
institutions to be significant (union density and the average replacement rate, respectively). 
   Despite Baccaro and Rei’s (2005) findings, we are not convinced that there is a 
meaningful direct union density effect. While Table 3 shows that seven of the eleven studies 
considered have found a significant effect for union density, the OECD’s recent literature 
survey (2006a, table 3.9) concludes that only five of the sixteen studies they cover show 
unequivocal positive (unemployment-increasing) effects. For two of these studies, Nickell 
(1977) and the IMF (2003), the positive union effect disappeared in our replication tests (see 
below). In addition, as noted in section 2, it is not clear what this variable actually measures. 
At best, it measures what it is supposed to measure - worker bargaining power – quite poorly. 
The effect of union density on employment performance is complicated by vast differences 
between density and coverage in some countries, and by the role of the centralization and 
coordination of bargaining, which in most tests are associated with lower unemployment. As 
the OECD’s Employment Outlook chapter on collective bargaining  (1999, Box 2.3, p. 55) 
concludes, “Notably there is little evidence of an effect of union density … on 
unemployment once other features of the collective bargaining system are taken in to 
account.”  
   It is widely accepted that strict employment protection regulations are central to any 
explanation of persistent high unemployment in Europe, but the panel data offer little 
supporting evidence. The evidence that appears in Table 3 is quite mixed. With the exception 
of the IMF (2003), the studies covered in this Table that find the predicted positive and 
significant effect on unemployment were all published before 2001. In these four studies, the 
implied effects of a one unit increase in EPL strictness on unemployment are substantially 
different, ranging from .24 to 1.43 percentage points. On the other hand, Nickell (1997),   31
Nickell et al. (2005), Belot and Van Ours (2004), Baker et al. (2004; 2005), Baccaro and Rei 
(2005) and the OECD (2005) all find no effect, or even unemployment-reducing effects. In 
the 1999 Employment Outlook, OECD researchers reached a similar conclusion: “The basic 
finding appears robust: overall unemployment is not significantly related to EPL strictness” 
(OECD, 1999, p. 77). Negative employment-related effects of current employment protection 
laws are likely to be found mainly among subgroups of workers – particularly youth and the 
least skilled, but the evidence remains thin (OECD, 2004a). 
  The results in Table 3 indicate that the Bassanini-Duval finding for benefit generosity is, 
with just a few exceptions, consistent with the results of earlier studies, and for this reason 
we will address its relationship to unemployment in more detail in the next section.    
   In sum, the cross-country panel data regression evidence as well as the recent time series 
evidence for the UK produces little compelling statistical evidence that protective labor 
market institutions are at the root of persistent high unemployment. The possible exception is 
generous unemployment benefit entitlements. The next section takes a closer look at the 
evidence on the role played by the unemployment benefit entitlement system. 
 
5. Unemployment Benefit Compensation and Unemployment  
   5.1 Some Initial Considerations 
  Most attempts t o explain the cross-country pattern of unemployment with panel data 
have found a statistically significant relationship for one or more measures of unemployment 
benefit generosity (see Table 3). This finding has been interpreted almost universally as 
empirical support for the orthodox prediction that generous benefits systems are at the root of 
persistent high unemployment. Indeed spurred by the growing influence of job search theory, 
the availability of unemployment benefits has become the cornerstone of the orthodox theory 
of wages and unemployment (Holmlund, 1998,  p. 115). As the costs of unemployment to 
workers decline, so does the incentive to search for work and take a job. This disincentive, in 
turn, could help increase the bargaining power of both new job applicants and current 
employees, and higher wages may in turn reduce labor demand and thus raise unemployment 
(and/or joblessness). 
  A good example of the application of this theory to the real world of high European 
unemployment is Lungquist and Sargent’s (1998, p. 547) influential paper. At the heart of   32
their model is the proposition that high unemployment in European welfare states can be 
explained by the “adverse effects of generous unemployment compensation” when their 
economies face “turbulent times.” Without reference to policy endogeneity, and with little 
reference to direct empirical evidence, they conclude with a recommendation that welfare 
states redesign their safety nets “to incorporate incentives to work” (548). This echoes, as 
Lundquist and Sargent point out, Layard, Nickell and Jackman’s (1991; 1994) view that 
“unconditional payment of benefits for an indefinite period is clearly a major cause of high 
European unemployment.”
21  
  On the other hand, one might expect a social system designed to provide insurance 
against unemployment would become more generous as the unemployment rate increased: 
with a decline in employment or the rate of employment creation, taxpayers could reasonably 
want to give unemployed workers additional time to search for the right job, thereby 
improving the quality of the match between workers and jobs. More generous benefits would 
reduce the harmful effects of lost income on workers and their families. This additional 
income would help sustain aggregate demand during economic slowdowns. The social, 
psychological, and health-related costs of unemployment are well established (Korpi, 2002) 
and there can be little doubt that many workers would choose employment over the dole, no 
matter how generous (Gallie and Alm, 1997). 
  Yet, it is perhaps indicative of the dominance of the orthodox view that, while briefly 
mentioned in the underlying working paper (Bassanini and Duval, 2006), there is no mention 
of the possibility of policy endogeneity in the OECD’s Employment Outlook (2006, Chapter 
7). This section begins with some reasons for caution in the interpretation of regression 
coefficients between benefit generosity and unemployment. We then turn to the 
microeconometric evidence, which has frequently been employed in support of the orthodox 
interpretation of the macro results.  
  
   5.2 Interpretation of Benefit Effects 
  Table 3 suggests a broad consensus finding that a 10 percentage point change in the 
OECD’s overall measure of benefit generosity will generate a change in the unemployment 
rate of about 1 percentage point. Applied to the median rate of 5.2 percent for 19 OECD 
countries (see figure 1), this suggests that the median country could reduce its unemployment   33
rate by about 20 percent (to about 4 percent) by reducing the average replacement rate from, 
say, 40 to 30 percent. But there are some reasons to believe that this is an implausibly large 
effect.  
  First, given the small share of workers directly affected by benefits system, the size of 
the effect seems implausibly large. A substantial number of unemployed workers do not 
actually receive benefits in the first place. Atkinson and Mickelwright (1991, p. 1692) 
flagged this long ago: “nearly one in five of those registered as claimants in Britain in 
November 1988 were in receipt of neither UA nor UI. In West Germany in December 1988 
over a third of registered unemployed received neither Arbeitslosengeld (UI) nor 
Argbeitslosenhilfe (UA).” According to the Eurostat Labour Force Survey, in 1995 the 
percentage of unemployed receiving any benefit or assistance was: Italy, 7%; Greece, 9%; 
Spain, 24%; Portugal, 27%; France, 45%; the Netherlands, 50%; Germany, 70%; Austria and 
Denmark, 66%; Ireland, 67%; Sweden, 70%; and Belgium, 81% (Manning, 1999, p. 144). 
According to the most recent evidence, the share of “ILO unemployed” actually in receipt of 
unemployment benefits in OECD-member countries ranges from around 20 to 80 percent 
(Immervoll et al., 2004, fig 3.6).  
  That recipiency rates tend to be much smaller than unemployment rates reflects the 
effects of two factors. The first is the “take-up” rate – the number of eligible workers who, 
for whatever reason, do not collect their benefits – which is estimated by the OECD to range 
from 60-80 percent (Hernanz et al. 2004, p. 4). The second is eligibility for benefits, which is 
particularly important for youth. 
  Younger workers, who in many countries account for a large part of the unemployment 
problem and who may be most sensitive to work incentives, may be either ineligible for 
benefits in the first place or eligible only for lower levels of benefits. The OECD’s Jobs 
Study (1994, p. 184) explored the association across countries between the maximum 
duration of wage-related insurance benefits (for a worker with a good employment record at 
age 20) and the share of long-term unemployment for ages 14-24: “For young people there is 
no correlation, perhaps because of the limited relevance for them of insurance benefits.”  
  More recent evidence supports this conclusion. Table 5 shows youth unemployment rates 
and net replacement rates for 20 year old single workers for 1999. Among the four largest 
continental European countries, three have by far the highest youth unemployment rates   34
(France, 26.5%; Spain, 28.3%; and Italy, 31.1%), but youth in these three countries were 
ineligible for unemployment insurance benefits (see column 2). As the OECD’s Benefits and 
Wages report (OECD, 2004b, p. 34) explains, “In France, Italy and Spain, the incomes of 
unemployed 20-year-olds without employment record are likely to be strongly dependent on 
informal family support as they qualify for none of these social benefits.” With reference to 
incentives, it is worth noting that a number of countries with very low youth unemployment 
(at or below 10%) are, according to the net replacement measure, extremely generous to their 
youth (Germany, the Netherlands, Ireland, and Denmark). If half the unemployed are not 
getting benefits, the measured effect must be twice as large for those who actually receive 
them. At a minimum, it seems fair to say that a policy reform that substantially reduced the 
replacement rate would have little effect on the youth unemployment rate.  
  A second reason to remain skeptical about the direct applicability of the regression 
results concerns timing and causality. To the extent that policy makers increase and decrease 
the generosity of benefits in response to the perceived need for a safety net, the statistical fit 
should not be interpreted as a measure of the disincentive effects of the benefits system. 
Figure 7 presents within-country unemployment and gross replacement rate(GRR) trends for 
four “success story” countries and four “failure” countries - “GRR” is the explanatory 
variable that so powerfully accounts for “UR” in the regression tests reported in Table 3.  
  Panel A of Figure 7 shows the GRR and UR trends for each of the success stories. While 
Denmark’s success has been the sharp decline in unemployment since 1993, GRR was stable 
at a high level over the previous decade, spiked upward between 1993 and 1995, and 
remained over 60% until 1999 – the highest of any OECD country. The Netherlands shows a 
modest hike in its GRR in the mid and late 1980s to above 50 percent, where it has stayed, 
but beginning in the mid-1980s, unemployment fell dramatically and fairly steadily through 
the end of the 1990s. This change in GRR measured by the OECD appears to contradict a 
national measure that shows a sharp decline between 1980 and 2000 (from 71% to 56%) that 
is heavily relied upon in the explanations given for the “Dutch Miracle” by Broersma et al. 
(2000) and van Ours (2003).
22 The Irish unemployment rate rose drastically in the early 
1980s, stayed very high between the mid-1980s and mid-1990s, and has fallen equally 
dramatically since, while the Irish GRR remained stable over this entire period. The British   35
unemployment rate has increased sharply twice and fallen sharply twice since the late 1970s 
while its GRR has edged gradually downward. 
  It is notable that if there is any relationship between GRR and UR trends for these four 
success stories, Granger-causality tests indicate that it is the unemployment rate that drives 
the benefits level in each case – just the reverse of the orthodox prediction. The first four 
columns of Table 6 show the F-statistics of Granger tests that unemployment  rates predict 
the benefit replacement rate, while the four columns in Panel B test the reverse – that 
unemployment benefit generosity predicts unemployment. To allow for the broadest 
reasonable test of the relationships, we present results separately for Granger tests that 
include one, two, three, and four lags of the gross replacement rate. Changes in 
unemployment predict changes in the benefits measure (GRR) for Denmark with significance 
at the 5-10 percent level for all four lags; for the UK at the 5-10 percent level for each of the 
first 3 lags; for the Netherlands at the 1 percent level for the first 2 lags and at the 5-10 
percent level over the 3
rd and 4
th year; and for Ireland with significance at the 1 percent level 
in the first year. Interestingly, another success story – the U.S. – shows this “reverse 
causality" as well for lags 3-4. 
  Returning to the GRR and UR time series in Figure 7, Panel B shows the trends for the 
four “failure” countries.  At least until the late 1990s, the trends for France appear to move 
roughly together, but it is clear that unemployment took off in the 1970s well before GRR 
began to edge up. Despite the pro-market policy shift in the early 1980s, French 
unemployment rates continued to rise, and in response to political protests, “the authorities 
expanded social spending to help protect workers from dislocation and to undercut resistance 
to measures of economic liberalization” (Levy 309; see also Blanchard, 2006). This is 
consistent with the Granger results shown in Table 6 for France: all four lags show a 
significant relationship from unemployment to GRR, and this is particularly strong for the 
first two years.  
  Nor do the trends in Panel B of Figure 7 suggest the orthodox account for the other three 
large high unemployment countries. Germany shows a steadily rising UR but a stable GRR. 
The trends for Spain show that since the mid-1980s GRR remained stable at a moderate rate 
of just above 30%, while unemployment shows a huge increase from the late 1970s through 
the 1980s, peaked at over 20% in 1994, and then fell sharply and steadily to 10.9% in 2004.   36
And finally, Italy’s unemployment rate rises steadily until 1995, remains stable and then falls 
steadily after 1998 despite rapid increases in a GRR that was effectively introduced in 1992. 
the Granger results in Table 8 offer some support for an unemployment to benefits effect for 
Italy, like the results for the four success story countries, the U.S. and France. There is no 
relationship either way for Germany and Spain. 
  Evidence that benefit generosity reflects the state of the labor market (“policy 
endogeneity”) has also been found by the OECD. Elmeskov et al. (1998, Table A.3) report 
results broadly consistent with ours -  Granger-causality running from higher unemployment 
to higher unemployment benefits for three of the countries with high levels of unemployment 
during this period - Belgium, France, and Italy - as well as for two countries with lower 
unemployment levels: the United Kingdom and the United States. More recently, in the 
“Political Economy of Structural Reform” (OECD 2006, p.18), the OECD concludes that 
“there is evidence that unusually high increases in unemployment rates are associated with 
increased employment protection … and relatively more generous unemployment benefits 
for the long-term unemployed (the latter is also triggered by higher long-term 
unemployment).”  
  Much has been made of the role that stricter eligibility rules (and stricter enforcement of 
them) have played in accounting for sharp declines in unemployment in countries like the 
Netherlands and Denmark. For example, van Ours (2003, p. 11) argues that “the introduction 
of a system of benefit sanctions may be one of the main policy measures responsible for the 
‘Dutch Miracle’.”  Similarly, Nickell et al. (2005) point out that despite continuing to provide 
“very generous unemployment benefits,” the Danish benefit system was “totally reformed” in 
the 1990s by “tightening of the criteria for benefit receipt and the enforcement of these 
criteria via a comprehensive system of sanctions.” For evidence of the importance of these 
reforms, they point out that the “The Danish Ministry of Labour is convinced that this 
process has played a major role in allowing Danish unemployment to fall dramatically since 
the early 1990s without generating inflationary pressure” (p. 4-5).
23  
  While tightening eligibility rules and their enforcement will tend to reduce participation 
in the unemployment compensation system, we are not entirely convinced that these reforms 
have played such a major role in either the Netherlands or Denmark. Referring to a new law 
toughening sanction policy that went into effect in August 1996, van Ours (2003) presents a   37
figure that shows the evolution of the number of unemployment benefit recipients and the 
number of sanctions. Sanctions increase sharply from 1996 to 1997, stay at that level in 1998, 
and then fall back in 1999 almost to 1996 levels. But his figure also shows that benefit 
recipients fell noticeably two years before the law went into effect, and continued to fall after 
the number of sanctions began to fall in 1999. This 1997-8 surge in sanctions took place in 
the midst of a collapse in unemployment rates – from 6.8% in 1994 to 3.2% in 1998 to 2.5% 
in 2001 – which suggests that the tightening of sanctions may have been more a reflection of 
a strengthening labor market (an environment in which it is much easier to be tougher) than a 
principal cause of this employment performance “miracle” in the first place. In another 
figure, van Ours (2003, figure 3) shows a huge takeoff in total number of working hours 
between 1995 and 2000, again suggesting that it may have been rapidly improving job 
opportunities rather than tougher enforcement policies that accounts for the sharp decline in 
unemployment.  
  If effective tightening of eligibility for participation in the unemployment benefit system 
played a leading role in reducing unemployment rates (despite keeping highly generous 
levels of benefits), we might expect to see low benefit recipiency rates, particularly relative to 
the country’s unemployment rate. Figure 8 shows unemployment rates and unemployment 
benefit recipiency rates (recipients as a share of the working age population), ranked by the 
unemployment rate in 1999. The Netherlands achieved an unemployment rate of just 3.2 
percent by the end of the decade, the best among these 16 countries. With a lower 
unemployment rate than the U.S., Japan, or the U.K., the Netherlands showed a higher 
benefit recipiency rate (4%). In short, the Netherlands was able to outperform these countries 
on unemployment despite a substantially larger share of the population receiving 
unemployment compensation. At the same time, Sweden and Spain had the same benefit 
recipiency rate as the Netherlands, and the French rate was only slightly higher, despite much 
higher unemployment in all three countries. 
  Figure 8 suggests a similar story for Denmark. After all reforms of the 1990s, Denmark’s 
benefit recipiency rate was still higher than seven of the 15 other countries in the figure, 
including Sweden and Spain, and was almost as high as the French rate. While both the 
Netherlands and Denmark reduced their benefit recipiency rates between 1990 and 1999 
(from 5.01 to 4.1 in the Netherlands and from 7.6 to 4.35 in Denmark), we would expect a   38
decline in benefit recipients as labor markets improve. Nevertheless, both countries show 
quite high recipient rates relative to their unemployment rates, suggesting, after the spate of 
1990s reforms, that each has achieved its successful employment performance while 
maintaining a relatively large and generous unemployment benefit entitlements system. 
Benefit generosity as measured by recipiency rates is uncorrelated with unemployment. 
Indeed, it is particularly striking how large the gap is between these two rates for the high 
unemployment countries (Spain, France and Italy). 
  
  5.3 The Microeconometric Evidence 
    5.3.1 Evidence from Literature Surveys    
  Evidence of the effects of unemployment benefit entitlements on individual behavior has 
frequently been cited in support of the orthodox interpretation of the macro evidence. A good 
example is Elmeskov et al. (1998, p.   ): 
 Turning to the role of labour market policies, there is strong evidence that more generous 
unemployment benefits (UB) lead to higher structural unemployment. The implicit 
average elasticity of unemployment with respect to the OECD summary measure of 
benefit entitlements is around 0.4, a value which is close to those often found in the 
microeconometric literature (Holmlund, 1998). These findings suggest that the effects of 
generous benefits on the reservation wage of unemployed job-seekers and/or on wage 
bargaining dominate any positive impact of benefits on search effectiveness. 
 
Nickell et al. (2005, p. 4) and the OECD (2006, Chapter 3, p. 59) also cite Holmlund (1998) 
for microeconometric evidence that more generous unemployment benefits lead to higher 
unemployment. 
  It is notable that a close look at what Holmlund actually writes produces a strikingly 
different picture. The only reference to an elasticity estimate of “.4” comes in a critical 
discussion of a paper by Mortensen. Holmlund refers to Mortensen’s “simulation results of 
UI policies in a parameterized version of the Mortensen and Pissarides (1996) model… A 
rise in the replacement rate from 30 to 40 percent would increase unemployment by at least 4 
percentage points, and possibly by more than 10 percentage points, according to these 
simulations” (Holmlund, p. 124). Holmlund then suggests that these estimates are 
implausibly large: 
“The most likely reason why benefit hikes apparently have a much stronger impact in 
Mortensen’s experiments than in those reported in Table 1 is because Mortensen   39
imputes a non-trivial value to leisure… Unfortunately, economists know virtually 
nothing about a reasonable estimate of the leisure value of unemployment. A liberal 
interpretation of some empirical evidence on unemployment and psychological well-
being suggests that the value may well be negative (emphasis in the original); see 
e.g., Blanchflower and Oswald (1997). Policy simulation that hinge crucially on 
assumptions concerning unobservables should therefore be used with more than the 
usual caution as prediction so what is likely to happen if a particular policy is 
implemented” (p. 124-5).   
    
  So, far from being a consensus estimate of the microeconometric literature by Holmlund, 
this .4 estimate is actually an example of an implausibly large estimate from what Holmlund 
suggests are rather fanciful policy simulations. Indeed, the Elmeskov et al. (1998) reference 
to Holmlund appears to directly contradict Holmlund’s own assessment: “Do the estimates 
from micro data give reliable answers to general-equilibrium questions about the effects UI 
on unemployment? In general, the answer is no” (p. 125). Holmlund goes on to conclude that 
“The weight of the evidence suggests that increased benefit generosity causes longer spells of 
unemployment and probably higher overall unemployment as well. But there remains a 
considerable degree of uncertainly regarding the magnitudes of these effects” (p. 137). 
Holmlund presents no direct evidence in support of effects on “overall unemployment” and 
makes clear that his conclusion reflects, not the balance of the statistical evidence, but “my 
own judgment” (p. 126). 
  Two responses to Holmlund’s survey were published in the same issue of the 
Scandinavian Journal of Economics. Manning (1998, p. 143) suggests that Holmlund’s “own 
judgment” in the absence of compelling evidence reflects the dominance of orthodox 
renditions of mainstream theory: “the strength of the evidence linking the generosity of the 
benefit system and unemployment is not as strong as we would like and our belief in such a 
link derives more from the theory than from the evidence.” In a second comment, Strom 
(1998, p. 151) also stresses the weak character of the evidence: “Neither microeconometric 
nor macroeconometric results give strong and/or convincing support to the predictions of a 
strong positive relationship between unemployment and unemployment benefits as indicated 
in microeconomic and macroeconomic theory.”  
  This is probably a stronger negative position than Holmlund would accept, but he 
presents little microeconometric support in his survey for “major effects” of unemployment 
benefit generosity on the unemployment rate. Holmlund (p. 138) concludes that “We are a   40
long way from a situation where economists can with any confidence provide policymakers 
with reliable menus for choice among key UI parameters.” 
  
   5.3.2 Micro Evidence on Unemployment Duration 
  At least after some threshold, more generous benefits can be expected to increase 
unemployment duration, and all else equal, this should increase unemployment rates. But all 
else is not equal and too frequently higher (lower) unemployment duration is conflated with 
higher (lower) aggregate and unemployment rates. In fact, higher levels and duration of 
benefits not only tend to increase the incentive to remain unemployed, but also tend to 
counter the effect of this increased incentive by influencing the inflows into both 
unemployment and employment. 
  Regarding inflows into unemployment, Atkinson and Mickelwright (1991, p. 1710) point 
out that greater benefit generosity may affect only the composition, not the level of 
unemployment: “Suppose for example that ceteris paribus we observe that persons with 
higher benefits exit unemployment more slowly. This does not necessarily mean that 
aggregate unemployment is higher since the refusal of jobs by one group may lead to the 
work being offered to others. In other words it is the composition of unemployment which is 
altered.”  
  Higher unemployment benefit generosity can also affect inflows into employment, which 
could limit or offset the effect of longer unemployment duration on the aggregate 
unemployment rate. Often referred to as the “entitlement effect,” Holmlund (1998, p. 116) 
explains that “for some workers, in particular those who do not qualify (or have ceased to 
qualify), higher benefits will make work more attractive relative to unemployment. The 
effect of higher benefits on the duration of unemployment is therefore, in general, 
ambiguous.” And if work becomes more attractive because it qualifies workers for more 
generous benefits should they become unemployed, this lower duration might actually tend 
to reduce the unemployment rate. The possibility of “composition” and “entitlement” effects 
means that there is no necessary direct relationship between average unemployment duration 
and the unemployment rate.    
  Early research suggested that benefit generosity had a strong positive effect on 
unemployment duration and that this, in the words of Lancaster and Nickell (1980) “is now a   41
rather firmly established parameter.” This same assessment appears in Layard et al. (1991). 
But the evidence from the 1970s and 1980s was in fact quite mixed. According to Atkinson 
and Mickelwright (1991, p. 1712), “As with the U.S. and the U.K., the evidence (from the 
rest of the OECD) does not suggest that the effects of benefits on transitions out of 
unemployment (however defined) are large or measured with precision.” At about the same 
time, Barr (1992, cited by Hammer, 1999, p. 132), comes to a similar conclusion: “Despite 
continuing controversy, the general conclusion is that though the duration of unemployment 
is likely to be slightly longer at higher replacement rates, the magnitude of the effect is not 
large.” With the benefit of research done in the 1990s on this question, Holmlund (1998, p. 
118) contends that the Lancaster and Nickell conclusion “was surely premature. The effect of 
benefits on unemployment duration is far from a firmly established parameter that is 
comparable in robustness to, say, estimates of the returns to schooling.”  
  Over the last decade, many studies have taken advantage of the natural experiment-like 
quality of major policy shifts, and these have tended to find more convincing evidence for a 
benefits effect on unemployment duration, though the magnitudes of the effects can be 
surprisingly small. Among studies finding fairly large effects is Roed and Zhangs (2003, p. 
204), whose study of Norwegian data suggested that a 10 percent decline in benefits “may 
cut a 10-month duration by approximately one month for men and 1-2 weeks for women.”  
  Lalive and Zweimuller (2004) examine a massive Austrian policy change that provided 
what they argue is an ideal natural experiment. Anticipating deteriorating labor market 
conditions in regions with heavy steel industry employment, the Austrian government 
“dramatically increased benefit generosity” for some workers in certain regions from 30 to 
209 weeks. They found a reduction in the transition rate to jobs of 17 percent, which meant 
“increasing unemployment duration by about 9 weeks, leading to an increase in 
unemployment duration per week of additional benefits of .055” (p. 2610).
24 In another study 
of this dramatic Austrian policy shift, Lalive et al. (2004) found that extending benefits from 
30 to 39 weeks for 40-49 year olds “tends to increase expected unemployment duration by 
.45 weeks… increasing replacement rates by 6 percentage points tends to increase 
unemployment duration by .38 weeks” (p. 18). The nature of the policy shift allowed the 
authors to assess the effects of the joint effect of raising the duration and level of benefits: a 
33 percent increase in potential benefit duration and a 15% increase in the level of benefits   42
combined to raise unemployment duration by 3-4 days. Whether this seemingly modest 
effect of a substantial increase in unemployment benefit generosity had any effect on 
aggregate unemployment rates would depend, as noted above, on the extent of composition 
and entitlement effects.  
  Jan van Ours and Vodopivec (2005, p. 3) investigate a 1998 reform of the benefits 
system in Slovenia that “drastically reduced the potential duration of unemployment 
benefits” and find “important and sizeable disincentive effects” (p. 17). With the drop in the 
maximum duration of entitlements from 12 to 6 months, they found that the share of 
unemployed who found a job within 6 months rose from 44 percent to 52.4 percent, an 8.4 
percentage point gain. But interestingly, those who exited unemployment but not into 
employment (out of the labor force) increased from 6 percent to 15.1 percent, an increase of 
9.1 percent. As the authors point out, the benefits of the rise in exits to employment “have to 
be weighted against possible additional hardship created by the curtailment of benefit 
entitlement, as well as worse quality of post-unemployment jobs in terms of their stability, 
type of appointment, and precariousness” (p. 17). In research on West Germany, Pollmann-
Schult and Buchel (2005) explore the effects of the duration of benefits on the quality of 
post-unemployment jobs. They conclude that “although receipt of benefits delays exits from 
unemployment, it raises aspiration levels and hence improves the quality of the eventual job 
match” (p. 35).   
  Evidence from micro data suggests that unemployment benefit generosity has quite 
limited effects on youth, consistent with the evidence presented above. In their study of cross 
country differences in the transition from unemployment to employment for youth, Russell 
and O’Connell (2001) find that successful transitions are positively related to unemployment 
generosity – controlling for differences in individual characteristics, Denmark and France 
show the highest exit rates to jobs while Spain, Italy and Greece show the lowest rates. “Of 
the institutional factors considered, only unemployment compensation payments did not 
operate in the expected manner: contrary to economic orthodoxy, lower levels of benefit 
coverage were associated with lower rates of exit to employment.” Part of this finding may 
be explained by the more extensive use of active labor market policies (ALMP) in the 
northern European countries, which facilitate job preparation and search. This is certainly the 
case for Denmark, which has perhaps the most generous benefits system but combines with it   43
an effective ALMP and strict enforcement of participation in these programs (Danish 
Ministry of Finance, 1998).  
   In sum, references to micro evidence for support of macro findings that show a positive 
relationship between unemployment benefit generosity and unemployment rates have, in our 
view, tended to greatly overstate the case. The evidence surveyed by Atkinson and 
Mickelwright (1991) and Holmlund (1998) on the relationship between benefit duration and 
unemployment duration was mixed, particularly for European countries. Although more 
recent “natural experiment” studies report fairly consistent effects in the expected direction, 
several of the examples cited above also show surprisingly modest effects from very large  
shifts in benefit generosity.  
  
 5.4 Assessment  
   This section has outlined some reasons for caution in concluding from the available 
regression evidence that benefit generosity is at the root of the pattern of unemployment and 
its change over time in OECD countries.   
 Concerning  the  interpretation  of the macroeconometric evidence, it should be recognized 
that in many countries, especially the high unemployment countries of Southern Europe 
(Spain, France, Italy), only a portion of the unemployed receive benefits. This means the 
presumed effects of benefit generosity on the supply (work incentives) and demand (wage 
pressure) sides apply to as little as 20-50 percent of the unemployed. Further caution is 
suggested by the timing and causality in the relationship between benefit generosity and 
unemployment rates. Time trends between gross replacement rates and unemployment show 
little correspondence for either the “success” or the “failure” countries, and Granger tests 
indicate that in most cases it is unemployment that predicts benefits, not the reverse (the case 
in all four success stories, two of the four failure countries, and the U.S.). And finally, the 
absence of any relationship between benefit recipiency rates and unemployment rates 
suggests that benefit generosity, strictness of eligibility rules, and the tough enforcement of 
those rules do not distinguish the “success stories.”  
  The microeconometric evidence offers some support for the predicted effects of changes 
in benefit entitlement generosity, eligibility rules, and enforcement strictness on the duration 
on unemployment benefit and the exit rate out of unemployment. But the results are   44
surprisingly mixed with often quite modest effects. In any case, such evidence does not imply 
that reductions in generosity or tightening eligibility rules would necessarily have any effect 
on the overall unemployment rate since changes in benefit generosity may have offsetting 
effects via inflows into unemployment and employment (“composition” and “entitlement” 
effects).   
  The orthodox prediction rests on large effects of the benefit system on the reservation 
wage and worker search behavior, and consequently on aggregate unemployment rates. 
There is very little direct evidence that establishes these links. What has been demonstrated 
is that most studies have found a significant statistical relationship between measures of 
benefit generosity and cross country patterns of unemployment. But we know of no research 
that has established that the direction of causation runs primarily in the orthodox direction, or 
that micro evidence linking benefit generosity and unemployment duration translates to 
aggregate unemployment rates. On the basis of the available evidence, it seems reasonable to 
remain skeptical that any conceivable change in typical European benefits systems could 
alter wage pressure and search behavior sufficiently to have substantial effects on the 
unemployment rate.  
 
6. Comprehensive Labor Market Reform and Unemployment 
  It has become increasingly recognized that the institutions that distinguish national labor 
markets tend to be complementary. In this case, reforms are likely to be more effective if 
implemented in a comprehensive manner across labor market institutions. The regression 
approach is not particularly well-suited for testing alternative models defined by differently 
designed mixes of institutions, although recent studies have attempted to allow for 
complementarity by interacting selected sets of institutions (e.g., the replacement rate and 
EPL; EPL and union density). In recent work on “varieties of capitalism” (Esping-Andersen, 
1999; Freeman, 2000; Hall and Soskice, 2003; Amable, 2003), it has been argued that 
dramatically different combinations of institutions can produce equally effective employment 
results, ranging from highly laissez-faire markets (the “American” model) to far more 
regulated markets and a large state role (the “Nordic” model).   
  This section critically assesses two recent efforts to show statistical support for a payoff 
from the implementation of comprehensive reform policies. In the research considered here,   45
“reform” generally means deregulation: less product market regulation, less unemployment 
benefit generosity, less employment protection, and lower trade union membership and 
coverage. Lower taxes are also viewed as reform. The same goes for increases in active labor 
market policy spending and the degree of coordinated bargaining, despite the fact that these 
last two “reforms” are in fact interventions designed to improve outcomes by moving away 
from decentralized markets. Still, the guiding hypothesis is that more comprehensive 
deregulatory reform will produce lower levels of unemployment.    
 
  6.1 Nickell’s Reforms Index 
In a recent paper, Nickell (2003) points out that European unemployment is 
concentrated in “the big four” countries (France, Germany, Italy and Spain). The goal of the 
paper is to “see how these institutional variables have changed over time and what these 
changes can tell us about why the European Big four countries have performed less well than 
most other countries on the unemployment front in the 1990s.” Based on his best judgments 
about the magnitude of changes in various labor market institutions and what changes qualify 
as either employment-enhancing or employment-unfriendly, Nickell develops a labor market 
reforms scorecard and explores its correlation with changes in unemployment between the 
early 1980s and the late 1990s. 
  Nickell accounts for 51% of the variation in unemployment over these two decades for 
20 OECD countries by regressing the sums of “ticks” (good changes) and “crosses” (bad 
changes) on nine institutional measures. On the basis of this evidence “We may reasonably 
conclude that the countries which had very high unemployment in the early 1980s and still 
have high unemployment today simply have too few ticks and/or too many crosses” (Nickell, 
2003). It is this evidence alone that Gilles St. Paul (2004: 53) cites for his conclusion that 
“rigidities that reduce competition in labor markets are typically responsible for high 
unemployment.” 
  But Nickell’s policy reforms scorecard – the net sum of ticks and crosses – actually fails 
to identify three of the four big high-unemployment countries.
 25  As Figure 9 shows, 
according to his net totals of ticks/crosses, only France gets more bad than good marks, and 
there is some question about the appropriateness of its score.
26 The Nickell scorecard 
indicates that both Austria and Switzerland should have shown about the same poor   46
performance as France. The three other high unemployment countries (Germany, Spain and 
Italy) get the same scores in the middle of the distribution (0 to 1) as the U.S. and Norway. 
This figure suggests that, for at least three of Nickell’s four persistent high unemployment 
countries, it is not reasonable to conclude that the problem has been simply too few ticks and 
too many crosses.    
 
  6.2 OECD Reforms Indices 
  A central pillar of OECD labor market policy has been that reforms that reduce labor 
market rigidities are the answer to persistent high unemployment. An enumeration of such 
reforms was carried out by the OECD (1999b) as part of its follow-up to The OECD Jobs 
Study (OECD 1994) and provides a comprehensive listing of changes in the generosity of 
unemployment benefits, the strictness of employment protection laws, the level of minimum 
wages and the like, focused on the period from 1995 but also with summary data from the 
early 1990s. The OECD also listed all the reforms recommended for each country in its labor 
market reviews, developed a weighting system for assessing their significance, and then 
analyzed whether the recommended reform had been fully implemented, partially 
implemented, ignored, or even flouted (in the sense that policy had moved in the “wrong” 
direction). The OECD’s “follow-through” measure was defined as the share of 
recommendations actually adopted, wholly or partially by each country.  
  The OECD found a significant positive relation between this measure of “follow-
through” and the extent to which the unemployment (the NAIRU) fell in the 1990s (OECD 
1999b: figure 2.7). This is presented as evidence that there has, indeed, been a payoff to 
countries that have implemented the Jobs Strategy recommendations.  
  Apart from any issues of the definition or weighting of reforms, the problem with this 
approach is that it ignores the very different number of recommendations for labor market 
reforms that each country received from the OECD.
27 Accordingly, we constructed an 
alternative index showing the “volume” of labor market deregulation recommendations that 
were actually carried out, which depends on both the number of measures advocated by the 
OECD and their “follow-through” by the countries. We limited our index to the OECD’s list 
of reforms related to unemployment benefits, employment protection, and wage bargaining 
systems, as these constitute the key labor market institutions typically regarded as   47
employment-unfriendly (see Baker et al., 2005).  Figure 10 compares this alternative index of 
labor market deregulation in the 1990s with the OECD’s estimate of the change in structural 
unemployment over the same period for 21 OECD member countries.  The figure shows no 
significant relationship between this narrower and more appropriately defined measure of 
deregulation and the change in unemployment across OECD countries. 
   The most recent OECD effort of this sort replaces these rather ad hoc measures of 
“reforms” with the coefficients from the Bassanini-Duval (2006) baseline regression. 
According to the OECD’s Figure 7.3b in the latest Employment Outlook (OECD, 2006), the 
unemployment predicted by changes in institutions and policies alone is highly correlated 
(.69) with changes in observed unemployment over the 1982-2003 period. We have 
decomposed this overall effect to determine the role played by protective labor market 
institutions (PLMIs). Figure 11 shows that the change in unemployment predicted by PLMI 
changes is far less strongly correlated to observed unemployment (less than .36). Two 
persistently low unemployment countries contribute to this modest correlation (Norway and 
Switzerland). As noted above in Section 2, Switzerland’s position in the Figure reflects the 
use of an unemployment rate in the base year calculated from administrative records which is 
wholly incomparable with the end year rate. Adding the tax wedge improves the correlation 
dramatically (to .65).  
  The country level changes underlying these correlations results appear in Appendix 1. 
Based on the Bassanini-Duval coefficients, this table shows the contributions of PLMIs 
(benefit entitlement levels, employment protection strictness, and trade union density) to the 
1982-2003 change in unemployment (column 1); this effect plus the effect of changes in the 
tax wedge (column 2); and the effect of changes product market regulation (column 3). These 
effects can be compared to changes in the observed standardized unemployment rate (column 
4). The table is sorted by these column 4 changes.  
  The top of the table shows that reforms in PLMIs played virtually no role in the success 
of the “success stories.”  In Ireland and The Netherlands – two of the four countries with the 
largest declines in unemployment, changes in "bad" institutions actually increased 
unemployment (1.5 and 1.1 percentage points respectively). Among the top 8 performers, 
where unemployment declined from 2.6 points to 7.4 points, the effect of these “bad” labor 
market institutions was negligible (.1 -.2 points, or from 1/26th to 1/74
th of the total change).   48
And finally, it is notable that among the four big high-unemployment countries, only Italy 
shows a large contribution of PLMIs to unemployment (4.8 points), but this mainly reflects 
the fact that Italy only adopted a benefits system in the early 1990s, after most of the increase 
in unemployment had occurred (see figure 7b). As for France, the 1.2 point contribution or 
PLMIs to French unemployment was more than offset by the effects of reduced product 
market regulation. On balance, the new Bassanini-Duval results suggest that core protective 
labor market institutions have played little role in cross-country changes in unemployment 
since the early 1980s. 
 
 7.  Conclusions 
  In his survey on the labor market effects of the unemployment benefit system, Holmlund 
(1998, p. 114) writes that “a hallmark of modern labor economics is the close interplay 
between the development of theory, data sources and econometric testing.” There can be 
little doubt that this interplay has greatly advanced our knowledge in many areas. At the 
same time, as Manning (1998) suggests in his comment on the Holmlund survey, theory 
seems the dominant partner in this interplay, playing a “disturbingly large part in informing 
the discussion” (p. 145).
28  
  Our survey was motivated by a concern that empirical research on the determinants of 
high unemployment has become increasingly driven by efforts to verify, or confirm, received 
theory, rather than by efforts to confront and critically test it, a general concern about 
empirical work in economics raised many years ago Mark Blaug and Robert Solow (Blaug 
1992).
29  As Blaug points out, it is rather easy to confirm; the test of a hypothesis is whether 
it stands up to critical scrutiny. As a result, our approach has been to take a skeptical stance 
and confront the orthodox view that protective labor market institutions and their changes 
over time can explain the evolution of differences in unemployment across countries since 
the early 1980s.  
  We began by noting that the cross-country pattern of unemployment has changed 
dramatically over the last three decades. For the major OECD countries, the overall picture is 
one of sharp increases in the level and dispersion of rates through the mid-1990s, followed by 
a striking decline in level and dispersion since. At the same time, we have seen large swings 
in unemployment in countries with very different institutional settings: the U.K, Ireland,   49
Canada and New Zealand among the English-speaking market-oriented countries; Spain and 
Germany among the continental European countries; and Denmark, the Netherlands, Sweden 
and Finland among the Northern European and Nordic countries. These are among the most 
extreme examples of the changes in employment performance that protective labor market 
institutions (PLMIs) are presumed to explain.  
  Given the difficulty of developing consistent time series of unemployment rates over 
time and across countries, and the perhaps even more daunting task of generating consistent 
time series of policies and institutions, it is a striking feature of this literature that hardly any  
attention has been placed on the consistency and quality of the data. There have been 
considerable efforts to improve the institutional variables, notably by the OECD, but gains 
from these improvements (and from the use of more sophisticated econometric methods) may 
have been compromised in studies that have extended the time series analysis back to the 
early 1960s with annual data, a research strategy that requires much better data than are 
currently available. For these reasons, the most recent entry into this field by the OECD 
examined just the period since 1982 (Bassanini and Duval, 2006; OECD, 2006). It is notable 
that as the data and econometric methods have improved, the number of PLMI measures 
found to be significant in the expected direction has plummeted: compare for example 
Scarpetta (1996) and Nickell (1997) with Baccaro and Rei (2005) and Bassanini and Duval 
(2006).  
   The widely accepted centrality of PLMIs for labor market performance might lead the  
unwary to believe that there would be some strong cross country relationships between the 
two. Indeed, simple scatter plots have frequently been employed in this literature to establish 
the connection between, for example, benefit duration and unemployment rates. But a closer 
look shows that, especially with the shift from the more subjective early institutional 
measures to the more carefully constructed OECD data that replaced them, such significant 
simple correlations do not show up in the data.  
  A large and increasingly sophisticated literature has employed measures of PLMIs in 
panel data models to explain cross country differences in unemployment. While significant 
impacts for employment protection, benefit generosity, and union strength have been 
reported, our review of these studies indicates that the effects for key PLMIs are distinctly 
unrobust, with widely divergent coefficients and levels of significance. The one possible   50
exception to this broad conclusion is the role played by unemployment benefit generosity, 
but little attention has been paid to the direction of causation – both common sense political 
economy considerations and granger test results suggest that much of any statistical 
association runs mainly from changes in unemployment to changes in benefit generosity.  
  The microeconometric evidence has frequently been cited as confirmation of the 
dominant macroeconometric findings. It is certainly not controversial that, at least after some 
threshold, greater benefit generosity will tend to discourage work. The question is whether 
politically realistic changes in benefit generosity (from, say, an average gross replacement 
rate of 40% to 30%) are likely to affect worker labor supply decisions and wage pressure 
sufficiently to have large, or even measurable impacts on the aggregate unemployment rate. 
Our review of this evidence indicates a wide range of effects and surprisingly small effects 
on behavior of what have been termed “drastic” changes in benefit generosity in recent 
“natural experiment” studies. In any case, it is important to recognize that the predicted 
effects of changes in benefit generosity will have no necessary effect on the overall 
unemployment rate since changes in generosity may have offsetting effects via inflows into 
unemployment and employment (“composition” and “entitlement” effects).   
  It is increasingly recognized that labor market institutions and policies are interdependent 
and that successful employment performance is likely to reflect coordinated reform efforts. 
Our final section looked at recent attempts to measure the impact of overall labor market 
reform on unemployment rates over the past decade or so. We find that the positive 
conclusion in these studies reflects more the initial orthodox presumption of a strong positive 
relationship than the actual statistical evidence presented, particularly concerning the impacts 
of the key PLMIs.  
  Such lack of robustness may very well be an inevitable feature of attempts to find  
uniform and reliable economic relationships with imperfectly measured institutions and 
policies, imperfectly measured macroeconomic shocks and shifting economic structures, and 
small numbers of (country) observations. But in the bulk of this literature there has been  a 
striking contrast between the fragility of the findings (both within and across studies) and the 
confidence with which it is  concluded from them that  labor market rigidities are indeed at 
the root of poor employment performance.    51
  This survey suggests that the interplay is disturbingly unbalanced – data resources and 
econometric testing have been employed too much towards the end of confirming the 
orthodox presumption that decentralized and unregulated labor markets produce better 
employment outcomes. Getting the real impacts of key protective labor market institutions 
right is of particular importance since presumptions about their size have guided so much 
policy advice over recent decades. Reforms that demonstrably reduce the well being of many 
workers should be undertaken only with compelling evidence about the magnitude of 
offsetting benefits.    52
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US    (%)  5.5  3.7 5.3 6.9 8.3 6.2 6.6 4.9  5.2 5.1 
Median    2.2  1.9 2.4 5.1 7.6 7.3 8.8 7.9  5.3 5.2 
Std.  dev.  1.60  1.22 1.62 2.20 3.35 4.47 3.94 3.93  2.27 1.96 
 
Sources: 5-year unemployment rates, 1960-99: Baker et. al., Appendix 2.  
Unemployment 2000-04: OECD Employment Outlook, July 2005, Statistical Annex. 
Unemployment 2005: OECD online (www.oecd.org). 
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Figure 2: Net Unemployment Benefit Replacement Rates and Unemployment for 20 OECD 
Countries, 2002

















































Sources: replacement rates: OECD Benefits and Wages 2004, table 3.3b (overall average net replacement 
rates over 60 months of unemployment); unemployment rates: OECD standardized rates. 
 
 
Figure 3: Unemployment Benefit Duration and Unemployment for 20 OECD Countries, 2001















































Duration is measured as the ratio of the net replacement rate for the 60
th to the rate for the “initial period” 
(1
st month), for single earner married couple without children, at 100% of the average production worker 
wage (OECD 2004, table 3.1a and table 3.2a).  
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Figure 4: Unemployment Benefit Duration and Long Term Unemployment for 20 OECD 
Countries, 2001


















































Duration is measured as the ratio of the net replacement rate for the 60
th to the rate for the “initial period” 
(1
st month), for single earner married couple without children, at 100% of the average production worker 
wage (OECD 2004, table 3.1a and table 3.2a). Long term unemployment is the share of the unemployed out 
of work at least 12 months (OECD Employment Outlook, 2002, Table G). 
 
 
Figure 5: Change in Unemployment Benefit Duration and the Change in Long Term 
Unemployment for 20 OECD Countries, 1991-2001
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Duration and long term unemployment for 1991 are defined as they are for 2001 (see Figure 4 for 
definitions and sources for 2001). Sources for 1991: benefit duration: OECD Jobs Study, 1994, table 8.1;  
long term unemployment: OECD Employment Outlook, 1996, Statistical Annex Table Q.  
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Figure 6: Change in Gross Replacement Rates and Unemployment Rates for 20 OECD 
Countries, 1982-2002
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Figure 7: Gross Replacement Rates and Standardized Unemployment Rates for 16 
OECD Countries, 1961-2004 
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Figure 8: Unemployment and Unemployment Benefit Recipiency Rates for 





























Source: OECD standardized unemployment rates, measured as a share of the labor force; OECD 
unemployment benefit recipiency rates, measured as a share of the working age population (OECD 
Employment Outlook 2003, Chapter 4, Table 4.A1.1)   63
Figure 9: Nickell's Policy Reform Scorecard: Net "Good" and "Bad" 
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source: author’s calculation from Nickell 2003, table 13. 
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Figure 10: Labor Market Deregulation and Changes in the 
NAIRU for 21 OECD Countries in the 1990s
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Figure 11 
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Table 1: Standardized Unemployment Rates 
by Gender and Age, 2003 
  MALE FEMALE 
  15-24 25-54  15-24  25-54 
Liberal OECD 
Countries        
US 12.9  4.6  11  4.6 
Australia   12.2  3.9  11.1  4.3 
Canada   14.9  6.1  11.8  5.9 
Ireland   8.7  4.5  7.4  3.1 
New Zealand   8.7  2.5  10.1  3.3 
UK   11.8  3.8  9.9  3.4 
 Average  11.5  4.2  10.2  4.1 
        
High Unemployment 
European Countries        
Belgium 15.8  6  19.5  7.4 
Finland 22.2  7  19.4  7.6 
France 20.8  7.4  22  9.8 
Germany   13.3  9.8  9.7  9 
Italy 20.7  5.2  27.2  9.2 
Spain 18.7  6.9  26.4  13.8 
 Average  18.6  7.1  20.7  9.5 
        
Lower Unemployment 
European Countries        
Austria   11.3  4.3  10.7  4.4 
Denmark 8.5  4.4  7.1  5.1 
Netherlands 7.9  3.7  8.1  4.4 
Norway 12.6  4.3  10.7  3.3 
Sweden 17.8  5.7  16.1  5.2 
Switzerland 8  3.5  7.3  4.6 
  Average  11.0  4.3  10  4.5 
Source: OECD, 2005: Statistical Appendix, Table C.   67
 
Table 2: Measures of Employment Performance, Social Protection and Collective 
Bargaining for 18 OECD Member Countries 











Employment Outcomes:     
1. Unemployment Rate 2004 (%)  5.2  9.1  5.0 
2. Employment Rate 2004  (%)  70.8  62.6  73.7 
3. Employment Rate <HS 2004 (%)  59.4  56.0  63.9 
Labor Market Institutions:     
4. Employment Protection 
Legislation  2003  (Index) 
1.2 2.6 2.2 
5. Unemployment Benefits – Net 
Replacement Rate 2002  (%) 
52 72 77 
6. Trade Union Density 2000 (% of  
employees) 
26 36 47 
7. Collective Bargaining Coverage 
2000 (% of employees)  
36 83 76 
8. Co-ordination of Bargaining  
2000 (index) 
1.7 3.8 3.9 
9. Active Labor Market Policy 
Spending YEAR? (% of GDP) 
0.5 1.0 1.2 
Other:     
10. Tax Revenue Share 2004 (% 
GDP) 
32 41 43 
11. Wage Inequality 2000 (50/10 
ratio) 
1.9 1.6 1.5 
12. < HS in population 2004 (%)  27  38  23 
Data are mean values for country groups.  
Liberal OECD Economies: Australia, Canada, Ireland,New Zealand, UK, USA 
High unemployment Europe: Belgium, Finland, France,Germany,Italy,Spain 
Low unemployment Europe: Austria, Denmark, Netherlands, Norway, Switzerland, 
Sweden. 
Rows 1-3, 12:  OECD Employment Outlook 2005 tables A and B 
Row 4: OECD Benefits and Wages 2004 Table 3.1.b 
Row 5: OECD Employment Outlook 2004 Table 2 A2.4 (calculated as average of  
benefits 
when unemployed after-tax to after-tax earnings and benefits in work for the average of 4 
family types and 2 wage levels) 
Rows 6-8: OECD Employment Outlook 2004 Tables 3.3, 3.5 
Row 9: OECD Earnings Dispersion Database 
Row 10: OECD Revenue Statistics 1965-2004 Table 8 
Row 11: OECD Employment Outlook 2005 Table 8 
Row 12: OECD Employment Outlook 2005 table D   68
 
Table 3:  Summary of Implied Impacts of Labor Market institutions on 
Unemployment: Selected Studies, 1997-2005 
 
 




 + 10 
PP 
UB Dur 
  + 1 yr 
ALMP 
+ 10 PP 
Union 






+ 1 unit 
Taxes 
+ 10 PP 
1. Scarpetta 1996 
  0.37 1.3 -- insig  1.1  -- -3.07  insig 
2. Elmeskov et al 
1998
b  1.43 1.29 --  -1.47 insig  --  -1.48
g  0.94 
3. Nickell 1997
a 
  insig 0.88  0.70 -1.92  0.96  3.60
f  -3.68 +2.08 
4. BGHS 2005 
(variation on  
 Nickell 1997
j) 
insig  insig  -- insig insig insig insig insig 
5. Blanchard / 
Wolfers 2000  0.24  0.70  1.27  insig 0.84 insig -1.13 0.91 
6. Belot &Van 
Ours  2005
c   insig -2.20 --  --  1.5  --  insig  insig 
7. Nickell et al. 
 2003/2005   insig .96 .17  --  .30  --  -3.92  .70 
8. IMF 2003  0.52  0.51  --  --  2.37  --  -0.27
h  -0.51
i 
9. BGHS 2004 
(variation on IMF 
2003
k) 
insig  insig  insig  -- ? -- ? ? 
10. Baccaro & Rei 
(ILO) 2005  insig insig --  --  1.02  --  insig  insig 
11. OECD 2006 
  insig 1.2 --  --  insig  --  -4.97 3.00 
             
 
Sources: Nickell 1997: Table 6: column 1; Elmeskov et.al 1998: table 2 column 1; Belot and Van Ours 
2002: Table 7, column 5; Nickell et al 2001, Table 13, column 1; Blanchard and Wolfers, 1999, Table 5, 
column 1; Bertola et al 2001, Table 9, column 1; Nicoletti/ Scarpetta 2002: Table 5.1 column 6; IMF 
(Debrun et. Al) 2003: Table 4.3, column 3; BGHS 2005: table 3.6 column 2; BGHS (2004) Table 4 column 
4??; Baccaro and Rei (2005): table 4 column 3; OECD 2005: Table 1.2, column 2. 
"Insig effect” means not statistically significant at 5% level; -- means variable not included in regression 
For footnotes, see Appendix 1 
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Table 4: Implied Effects of Labor Market Institutions on the Unemployment Rate Using 
Coefficients from the IMF (2003) Study 
Source: IMF 2003 and authors’ calculations. These calculations use the published 
regression results in IMF 2003, Table 4-3. The estimated impact for interacted variables 
assumes that the interacted variable has the mean value for the OECD nations for 1998. 
The calculation for the impact of a one unit increase in bargaining coordination assumes 




 Regression  Number     
     I    II    III   IV 
Employment Protection index (+1 unit)   1.47   0.30   0.52  -0.44 
Replacement Rate (+10 PP)   0.68   0.53   0.51 0.57 
Union Density (+10 PP)   1.57   3.90   2.37  0.21 
Bargaining  Coordination  Index  (+1  unit)  -2.46 -0.48 -0.27 0.01 
Tax Wedge (+10 PP)   2.66   0.67  -0.51  1.12 
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Table 5: Youth Unemployment and Net Replacement Rates (NRR)  
for a 20 Year Old Single Person, 1999 
(percent) 
 
Liberal OECD Countries 
Unemployment 
Ages 15-24  
Initial NRR 
(only UI or UA) 
Long-term NRR 
(includes SA) 
US  9.9  0 10 
Australia  13.5  39 0 
Canada  14  0 35 
Ireland   8.5  10 68 
New Zealand  13.8  50 0 
UK   12.3  60 60 





Belgium  22.6  33 51 
Finland      
France  26.5  0 0 
Germany   8.2  26 52 
Italy  31.1  0 0 
Spain  28.3  0 32 





Austria   5.9  0 41 
Denmark  10  69 85 
Netherlands  7.4  20 33 
Norway  9.6  0 53 
Sweden  14.2  44 79 
Switzerland      
Sources: Unemployment: OECD Employment Outlook 2002 (statistical annex table c) 
          Net replacement rates: OECD Benefits and Wages, 2002 (Table 3.8) 
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TABLE 6                            
Granger-Causality Tests, Gross Replacement Rate and Unemployment Rate, 1962-2004          
(F-tests)                            
                                                     
  Unemployment Rate to Gross Replacement Rate    Gross Replacement Rate to Unemployment Rate 
Lags  1     2     3     4        1     2     3     4    
                            
Australia  1.32   3.62 *  2.54 #  1.48     0.78   1.39   3.03 *  2.72 * 
Austria  1.48   2.37   0.62   0.87     1.78   2.06   1.30   1.37  
Belgium  0.12   0.88   0.59   0.57     4.40 *  2.00   1.92   1.70  
Canada  0.04   1.51   1.06   0.66     4.02 #  3.22 #  2.03   1.82  
Denmark  6.67 *  3.10 #  2.14   2.17 #   0.18   1.35   1.81   1.50  
Finland  1.62   0.08   0.76   0.66     3.50 #  3.49 *  1.52   1.32  
France  6.48 *  7.86 **  2.91 *  2.56 #   0.60   0.57   0.23   0.65  
Germany  1.53   2.24   1.10   1.01     0.05   0.37   0.29   1.11  
Ireland  10.06 **  2.39   2.05   1.88     0.05   0.95   2.91 *  1.80  
Italy  5.22 *  1.69   2.31 #  1.72     1.48   0.52   0.39   0.64  
Japan  5.46 *  3.49 *  2.56 #  4.14     0.76   0.16   0.57   0.48  
New 
Zealand  0.01   0.10   0.09   0.14     0.06   0.91   0.56   0.36  
Netherlands  18.67 **  5.82 **  3.57 *  2.26 #   5.98 *  0.79   1.04   0.63  
Norway  0.59   0.38   1.32   0.76     5.12 *  6.09 **  2.76 #  4.37  
Portugal  6.06 *  1.63   1.50   1.86     0.24   0.34   0.35   0.27  
Spain  0.87   2.13   1.46   0.79     0.66   1.97   1.18   2.11  
Sweden  1.82   0.04   0.28   0.76     1.74   1.54   0.95   0.74  
Switzerland  1.48   0.32   0.45   0.49     1.74   4.76 *  3.52 *  4.08 ** 
UK  5.79 *  3.71 *  2.52 #  1.65     0.94   0.98   0.31   0.09  
US  1.97   1.17   5.35 **  3.87 *   0.88   0.35   0.75   0.94  
                                                     
Notes: Authors' analysis of OECD data. In the first four columns, F-tests are distributed under the null hypothesis   
that the unemployment rate does not Granger-cause the gross replacement rate; in the last four columns, under the   
null hypothesis that the gross replacement rate does not Granger-cause the unemployment rate. Results marked **   
are statistically significant at the 1% level; *, at the 5% level; and # at the 10% level. Full sample for Netherlands is   
1970-2004.                            
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Endnotes 
                                                 
1  Special thanks to Paul Swaim for data and extensive comments and advice. We also  
thank Bruno Amable, Tony Atkinson, Andrea Bassanini, Romain Duval, Donatella Gatti, 
and Bob Pollin for valuable comments. Howell thanks the Gould Foundation and 
CEPREMAP for support. Corresponding author is Howell (howell@newschool.edu). 
 
2  The 1979 and 1983 figures come from an OECD-based series received from IMF 
researchers (IMF 2003). The recent figures are taken from the OECD Employment 
Outlook 2005, Statistical Annex, Table A. OECD country membership has expanded 
greatly since the early 1980s and our reference to “OECD-Europe” refers to 19 European 
countries that appear in Table A. 
 
3  If there is a single labor market institution at the heart of the rigidity account it is the 
unemployment benefit system. As Bertil Holmlund (1998, p. 114) has written, “The research 
devoted to UI in the past couple of decades is closely intertwined with the retreat of 
traditional Keynesian macroeconomics and the development of theories of  the natural (or 
equilibrium) rate of unemployment… In fact, in many simple models, the wage replacement 
rate provided by UI is often the only explicit exogenous variable that determines 
unemployment.”  
 
4  For example, “an exogenous increase in the generosity of benefits does not seem to 
have been a prime factor causing the rise in unemployment” (p. 594); “As well as failing 
to find any link between unionization and persistence (of unemployment)…” (p.  610). 
  
5  We thank Paul Swaim for this point.  
 
6  We thank Paul Swaim of the OECD for making these data available to us. 
 
7  These differences largely reflect different adjustments made to account for both the 
shift from registered to household data between 1982-3 and another major break in the 
series in 1987, but the IMF data also show a significantly lower rate for 2003.    
 
8  In the OECD’s LFS series (OECD 2004, Appendix: Notes by Country), unemployment 
rates are generated from administration-based sources prior to 1984 for Germany, prior to 
1983 for The Netherlands, and prior to 1986 for New Zealand. For Belgium, the entire 
unemployment series is based on registration data.   
 
9  Atkinson and Mickelwright (1991) actually refer to the “duration of benefit” scores 
from Layard (1989), which if not the same, are quite similar: all four countries that get an 
“indefinite” score in the Layard data that are reproduced in Atkinson and Micklewright 
get the same score in Table 5 of Layard et al. (1994), which is the source for the benefits 
variable in the scatter plot. 
  
10  The change in the net replacement rate comes from Chapter 3 of the OECD 
Employment Outlook (OECD, 2006, table 3.2). This NRR is measured as the average   73
                                                                                                                                                 
over 60 months of unemployment. The change in NRR is from 1995-2004; the change in 
GRR is from 1995-2003 (the most recent available). 
 
11  It is not clear why this second test (for just 14 countries for 1987-93) was even run, 
except for the sake of symmetry, since the unemployment data were available for this 
more recent time period. 
 
12  We use the data set on expenditures on ALMP as a share of GDP per unemployed 
person, provided to us by the OECD. In the regression analysis, following Nickell (1997), 
we instrument the potentially endogenous ALMP variable using the average level of 
expenditures over the full 1985-99 period for which we have data. 
 
13 One additional difference between Nickell (1997) and the regressions in columns one 
and two is that Nickell (1997) uses the log of unemployment, while we use the level (in 
the line with most other studies). Using the log of the unemployment rate does not change 
qualitatively the results in Table 6. 
 
14   For example, the -0.078 coefficient of the country specific trend estimated for 
Sweden would imply a drop of almost 3.0 percentage points in Sweden’s unemployment 
rate after ten years. The logic of this is that the time trend variable directly decreases the 
unemployment rate by 0.078 percentage points each year. The lagged dependent variable 
means that in addition to this direct effect, the current year’s unemployment rate Ut is 
equal to the 0.87 times the increment added directly or indirectly due to the trend in Ut-1.    
The implied effect of Sweden’s time trend after twenty years would be a drop in the 
unemployment rate of more than 7.0 percentage points. While the absolute value of the 
coefficient on Sweden’s time trend is considerably larger than the average, the 
coefficients for most of the country time-trends are large enough to imply an increase or 
decrease of at least 2 percentage points in the unemployment rate after two decades. 
 
15 In addition to using country-specific time trends, the IMF also uses country-specific 
terms for the inflation-unemployment trade-off. In other words, unlike prior studies, the 
IMF does not impose the restriction that the trade-off between inflation and 
unemployment is identical for all countries. The IMF also includes somewhat novel 
specifications for the standard set of institutional variables. Specifically, the regressions 
include a quadratic term for bargaining coordination. This allows for the possibility that 
the effect of bargaining coordination on unemployment may not be linear. It also includes 
(like Nickell et al.) a lagged dependent variable. However, the IMF also separately 
includes interaction terms for the lagged unemployment rate multiplied by the benefit 
replacement rate and the lagged unemployment rate multiplied with the bargaining 
coordination level. In principle, these additional variables allow for the possibility that 
these institutions affect the persistence of unemployment through time. The other 
noteworthy departure of the specifications used by the IMF is the inclusion of a variable 
for central bank independence. This allows for the possibility that independent monetary 
policy may either lead to higher unemployment – possibly as a result of shielding central   74
                                                                                                                                                 
bankers from political pressures to try to reduce unemployment – or alternatively, to 
lower unemployment as a result of consistent well-planned monetary policy. 
 
16 The IMF states that all four specifications are reasonable representations of reality. For 
example, the IMF writes that "the very simple model [in variant one] does a good job in 
explaining unemployment variation across countries (although not across time)" (p. 148). 
The IMF's preferred specification is arguably variant three, but this equation includes 
complicated interactions between institutions and the lagged dependent variable that 
make it difficult to use in various simulation exercises. Variant four is based on variant 
three, but without these interaction terms. 
 
17   We include a common set of time dummies in order to remove global shocks 
(good and bad) and common business-cycle effects over the 1960-98 period. We see little 
theoretical justification for imposing a common time trend, and even less justification for 
including a separate time trend for each country. To the extent that unemployment in 
OECD economies is trended over time, the role of this kind of modeling ought to be to 
explain such a trend, not to control for it. In the same spirit, models should seek to use 
institutions (and other economic variables) to explain differences in trends across 
countries. A common set of time dummies allows us to control for common global 
shocks, leaving national institutions to explain deviations from unemployment from the 
average pattern implied by these shocks. A common time trend or country-specific time 
trends leaves institutions (and other variables) only the task of explaining deviations from 
the typically rising trend in unemployment.  
  We also use a common term for the change in the consumer price index (CPI), 
rather than country-specific CPI terms. Much of the interest in this kind of research is 
precisely on the way in which national institutions change the nature of the tradeoff 
between inflation and unemployment in particular countries. The argument that the data 
reject the common CPI (or time trend term) is not particularly persuasive since the data 
almost certainly reject common coefficients for the institutional variables (except in the 
case where the institutional results themselves are poorly defined). 
 
18 The first-difference specification may also act as a crude guard against problems arising 
from the possibility that the series regressed here are not stationary and not cointegrated. 
If the variables follow a random walk with drift, differencing would yield stationary 
series. The IMF does not present any tests of stationarity or cointegration, but standard 
theory suggests that the coefficient estimates presented in the WEO and here would be 
invalid if the series are not stationary or cointegrated (see, for example, Davidson and 
MacKinnon (1993), Chapter 10).  Junakar and Madsden (2004) and Baccaro and Rei 
(2004) discuss this issue in the context of OECD unemployment. 
 
19  For example, Nickell (2003) allocates more “good” policy changes to the UK (6 ticks) 
than to any other country, getting credit for reducing the replacement rate (1 tick), 
increasing benefit system strictness (1 tick), reducing union coverage (2 ticks) and union 
density (1 tick), and for reducing labor taxes (1 tick). 
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20  The only variable which is significant and with the correct sign is the price and tax 
wedge in the wage equation. The interpretation we advance for this general finding on the 
supply-side variables is that when other variables which have figured in the debate on the 
determinants of medium term unemployment are also used, they regularly outperform the 
supply-side terms” (Henry, 2004, p. 22). 
 
21 As we noted above, whatever the empirical strength of this relationship, Atkinson and 
Mickelwright (1991) definitively put to rest the notion that there has ever been any European 
country with unconditional and indefinite unemployment benefit entitlements. 
 
22 According to van Ours (2003), “The decline in replacement rate had a clear effect on 
unemployment.” But before we can be sure of how clear this effect is, we would need an 
explanation for the stability of the OECD measure shown in Figure 9. 
 
23 The Survey by the Danish Ministry of Finance (1999) does state that “The level of 
structural unemployment has evidently fallen over the last years, due to the extensive 
reforms of the labour market, cf. chapter 2” (p. 9). But turning to chapter 2 we find Box 
2.1, titled “Labour market initiatives since 1993.” A close look at these initiatives reveals  
that what is being tightened are the links between benefit receipt and participation in 
active labor market programs, and the improvement and expansion of these programs. 
While it is not unreasonable to assume that these initiatives played an important role, 
Chapter 2 offers no direct statistical evidence on the relationship between the decline in 
the Danish unemployment rate and the tightening of the linkages between the benefit 
entitlement system and participation in active labor market programs. 
 
24  The distinctiveness of this study was that they were able to take into account policy 
endogeneity – had they not been able to account for actual changes in the labor market, the 
decline in the transition rate to jobs would have appeared to have been much larger - 40 
percent.   
 
25  We do not take issue here with the reforms scorecard per se. This means we set aside 
questions regarding 1) which institutions to include (e.g., taxes and ALMP might not be 
considered, for reasons mentioned above); or 2) what threshold should determine a cross 
or a tick for each of the 9 measures; the poor quality of some of the measures (e.g., there 
is in fact no good cross-country measure of the strictness of eligibility rules for 
unemployment insurance, much less how this measure may have changed over time). 
26 It could easily be argued that Nickell’s allocation of ticks and crosses for France is 
among the most problematic. For example, in Nickell’s table 5, France gets a cross on the 
basis of changes that took place in the 1980s, not the 1990s, and gets no credit (a tick) for 
reducing union density from 16% to 10%, a level below that of the U.S.. It gets another 
for increasing strictness of employment protection, which turns out to have been entirely 
due to changes in regulations that apply to temporary workers, who comprise just 15% of 
the workforce. Finally, Nickell’s criterion for a cross on EPL is a rise of more than .1; 
France’s score increases from 1.3 to 1.4 (exactly .1). France gets a cross. 
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27  For example, recommendations varied from 4 in the case of US and Australia to 21 for 
Finland and 23 for Germany. The effect of reforms on unemployment should presumably 
depend on how many were actually implemented, not simply the proportion of 
recommendations implemented. One would think that the implementation of 11-12 
recommendations by Germany (50%) would have a greater payoff to employment 
performance than the implementation of just 2 by Australia (50%).   
 
28  As Manning puts it, “the strength of the evidence linking the generosity of the benefit 
system is not as strong as we would like and our belief in such a link derives more from 
the theory than from the evidence” (1998, p. 143). 
 
29  As Mark Blaug (1992, p. 241) puts it: “Modern economists all too frequently are 
satisfied to demonstrate that the real world conforms to their predictions, thus replacing 
falsification, which is difficult, with verification, which is easy.” Similarly, he quotes 
Robert Solow as saying that “Economists don’t ask themselves – and I think this is the 
worst sin of them all – whether there doesn’t exist a different model that would fit the 
data equally well, and what does that tell me? So I think that the problem with 
economists is that they do too much uncritical empirical work, and that they deceive 
themselves with the refinements of their methods” (p. 242).  
 